More on AI that you can’t afford to miss

Thanks to  视觉中国 (@vcgimage) for use of the photo

A post instigated by the recent lecture from Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls and Head of Civil Justice

Sir Geoffrey Vos is a truly modern judge. His court is paperless. His keynote lecture, ‘Transforming the Work of Lawyers and Judges‘ delivered on 8 March 2024 to the Manchester Law Society concerned predictably, artificial intelligence and the law. Early in his lecture he asked, teasingly, when the time will come when a lawyer would be considered negligent in not using AI?

The handful of assiduous followers to this blog will recall that I have previously posted about artificial intelligence impacting on our work, mostly stimulated by presentations from the Master of the Rolls.

Sir Geoffrey posed two principles for lawyers: that we must embrace constructive use of effective technology for better, quicker and more cost-effective service; whilst endeavouring to protect our clients from adverse cyber risks arising from its use.

In judicial guidance for using AI, issued on 12 December 2023, Sir Geoffrey described its limitations succinctly: a Generative AI large language model is ‘trained to predict the most likely combination of words from a mass of data. It does not check its responses by reference to an authoritative database’. In other words, AI sort-of checks its own homework. At the moment of information-generation, the teacher is absent – as is the White Book at the time of marking.

When asked how AI can assist lawyers, it proposed: legal research; drafting documents and contracts; factual/legal case analysis, legal education; drafting letters, memos, briefs and opinions; resolving ethical issues; translation; giving guidance on LawTech and practice management.

Sir Geoffrey was particularly impressed by AI’s contract drafting.

When I asked ChatGPT and CoPilot to draft a tenancy agreement, they provided near-perfect drafts – with a caveat from ChatGPT that I should seek legal advice to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and a suggestion from CoPilot that I  consult the official Model Agreement for a Shorthold Assured Tenancy provided by the UK government.

When I asked Gemini it responded, ‘I can advise on the existence of resources but cannot provide a legal document like a house letting contract. Here’s why: Legal complexities: Accurately reflecting landlord-tenant laws and ensuring enforceability requires legal expertise. Importance of specific details: Each tenancy agreement needs customization based on the property, duration, and specific situations’. It did, however, go on to identify the Government data base to provide a suitable precedent, and concluded by recommending the use of a solicitor or experienced conveyancer!

AI is unlikely, says Sir Geoffrey, to be optional in the near future. Already it can provide workable outlines, documents, summaries and advices quicker and more comprehensively that its human counterpart. A lawyer that disregards it will be viewed like an accountant using an abacus – maybe right, but possibly negligent.

Interestingly, Sir Geoffrey raised the topic of AI itself being the subject matter of litigation, including liability for its use, non-use or misuse, as well as its content and functioning.

A question remains as regards ‘automated decision making’. As the Master of the Rolls points out, such decisions are regularly and reliably made in other fields. He envisages that decisions may ultimately be made ‘by a machine’ albeit subject to appeal to a human.

Where does Sir Geoffrey leave us? It’s clear. Right now we should be road-testing Generative AI to learn its strengths and weaknesses; where we can use it to advantage, and when we should be cautious. In our professional lifetimes there will come a moment that, without it, we will cease to function competitively.

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Sir Geoffrey Vos MR and the 20th Annual Law Reform Lecture

A post arising from the keynote presentation from Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls, relating to artificial intelligence and the law.

He doesn’t use paper unless he has to. If you appear in his court you will need to be digital.

Sir Geoffrey Vos MR presents a refreshingly modern wind blowing through the civil courts. On Thursday 22 June, in the 20th Annual Law Reform Lecture from Lincolns Inn, he envisaged a clear role for artificial intelligence in managing legal conflicts, helping to resolve them, and delivering digital justice.

Let’s start with acquiring information. Whilst current AI bots scour the entire World Wide Web using the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Sir Geoffrey anticipates a legal AI that will work through a closed portal using application programming interface (AAPI) to link only to government legislation facilities, recognised case report services and established practitioner guides such as the White Book. Being a closed source would eliminate incursions of the mad and the bad. Available to the public at large, using predictive analytics, this could provide a safe, understood, advisory chatbot steer (formerly of the type given by lawyers) whilst ensuring transparency of sources.

Dispute resolution involves more than court hearings. Sir Geoffrey expects actual and potential conflicts to be diverted through ADR systems via AI that will propose outcomes before parties proceed to litigation. It would promote mediation and arbitration as a key mechanism to resolve civil disputes.

A third tier would be AI for lawyers, enabling document drafting (including, says the MR, drafting submissions), document analysis, due diligence, and specialist problem-solving legal case analysis and research. To avoid the terrible fate of US Attorney Steven A Schwartz any offering would need to hyperlink to verifiable and verified sources!

The final area would be during the court process itself, in which AI could play a part in signposting information for the judge, proposing analysis and offering solutions. Save for routine cases, the final adjudication would, of course, be down to the judgment of a human judge.

To prepare ourselves for AI, Sir Geoffrey suggests that we need to reduce our dependency on text-readable documents, such as Word and PDF and move from the ‘digitally accessible’ (requiring translation by the bot) to the ‘machine readable’. Here it seems, the Master of the Rolls must have been reading my previous post from June 2021.

Supporting Sir Geoffrey was a dream-team panel composed of Jamie Susskind (11 KBW), Shoban Iyer, FCIArb (Swan Cbrs) and Dr Matthew Lavy KC (4 Pump Ct), chaired by Eleena Misra KC (Old Square Cbrs). A question for them related to the regulation of AI.

Overall it was felt that process-only systems may require little or no oversight – they would either be found fit for purpose or be speedily changed. However, regulation would become more pertinent in those areas where the AI bot was allowed to roam, picking up uncertified information that, with possible bias in algorithms, may result in untoward outcomes. The use of closed portals would obviate the necessity for this (assuming the sources too were protected), although transparency as to the sources they access and source management would be needed for credibility.

When huge, influential intellects like that of the Master of the Rolls not merely engage, but lead on artificial intelligence, the rest of us day-to-day lawyers should wake up and smell the coffee, as they say. AI is already included as a study module to cater for the law students who (to continue the analogy) will be our profession’s future baristas.

Perhaps now is a good time for you to check out ChatGPT. When I asked it, ‘What role will AI take in UK legal services?’, the bot responded with the answer set out in full below. Yet a question occurs to me: had the bot not known I was a lawyer, would it have added its last placatory paragraph?

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‘Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to significantly impact various aspects of legal services in the UK. Here are a few roles AI is expected to play in the legal field:

  1. Legal Research and Document Analysis: AI can assist lawyers in conducting legal research more efficiently by quickly analyzing vast amounts of legal texts, cases, and precedents. AI-powered algorithms can identify relevant legal documents, extract key information, and provide valuable insights, thereby saving time and effort.
  2. Contract Analysis and Due Diligence: AI can be utilized to review and analyze contracts and legal agreements. Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms can extract relevant clauses, identify potential risks or anomalies, and help lawyers in due diligence processes. This can enhance accuracy, speed up contract review, and minimize errors.
  3. Predictive Analytics and Case Outcomes: AI can leverage historical case data to predict the potential outcomes of ongoing cases. By analyzing past judgments, legal arguments, and contextual factors, AI algorithms can provide insights into the probability of success, helping lawyers make more informed decisions and develop effective legal strategies.
  4. Legal Chatbots and Virtual Assistants: AI-powered chatbots and virtual assistants can provide basic legal information, answer frequently asked questions, and guide individuals through legal procedures. This can improve access to legal services, especially for those who cannot afford traditional legal representation.
  5. E-Discovery and Data Management: AI can streamline the e-discovery process, which involves the identification, collection, and review of electronically stored information (ESI) for legal cases. AI algorithms can analyze large volumes of data, identify relevant information, and flag potentially privileged or sensitive data, making the process faster and more accurate.
  6. Compliance and Risk Management: AI can assist in monitoring regulatory compliance by analyzing vast amounts of data and identifying potential risks or violations. This can help organizations stay updated with legal requirements, detect patterns of non-compliance, and mitigate legal risks.

It is important to note that while AI can offer numerous benefits to the legal sector, it is unlikely to replace human lawyers entirely. Legal expertise, judgment, and ethical considerations are crucial elements that AI currently lacks. Therefore, AI is more likely to augment legal services and empower lawyers rather than replace them.’

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Born into care

A post examining improvements that can be made to short notice hearings when the state intervenes at birth.

The family justice system in England may require new born babies to be removed from their parents and taken into local authority care for their protection; and such cases have been increasing.

This was the topic hosted by Lancashire County Council in today’s webinar ‘Born into Care: Developing best practice guidelines for when the state intervenes at birth’. It focused on how to:

  • disseminate the findings from the Born into Care research to local authority and private practice lawyers, barristers, Cafcass officers and Judges;
  • disseminate work being done across Lancashire in children’s social care and midwifery to implement the guidelines for good practice; and
  • hear the voice of parents who have lived experience of care proceedings involving their babies.

The ‘Born into Care‘ study undertaken by the Nuffield Foundation comprises 63 pages of research and findings covering all of the areas in which professionals intervene to remove children. This post addresses preparation for the court hearing alone, so the assiduous reader may well wish to reference the complete study for context.

Pauline, a public contributor to the webinar, spoke of the trauma of being told that she must attend an urgent hearing soon after the birth of her baby. She recounted how she was required to leave her child in the care of others, not knowing whether they would be reunited. After missing the bus to court, on her late arrival she was afforded no court familiarisation, but required to wait alone. Her participation in the hearing was minimal, but fortunately she was given some keepsake clothing after the decision to remove her child was made.

To my question of Pauline about the role of video connection to a hearing room, her answer was clear. For her, remote connection would have been massively helpful. HH Judge Clive Baker DFJ Cumbria followed this up with a further question of what steps could support this.

And this is what we found.

First, a private facility should be available for new mothers to electively connect remotely to a court with trusted information technology support. This may be a hospital room, separate health visitor facility or solicitor’s office that would enable mother and baby to be together whilst supported by her advocate, nursing professional or social worker. In one move the arrangement would avoid separation, travel, corridor waiting and isolation.

Before connecting to a live hearing, mothers and fathers who attend remotely should be afforded a five minute familiarisation in which they are connected to the court room, the layout explained and the advocates introduced. Parents should be reminded of the process: who speaks first, what the judge will want to know, and when a decision will be made.

Prior to the hearing day, the ‘short-notice hearing’ should be explained with care so that parents are prepared. This could be undertaken by the midwife, social worker or health visitor in situations where a solicitor is yet to be appointed. Clearly, a short and simple written guide to this end would be helpful.

Where the pregnancy is known and a removal hearing is a possibility, local authorities should arrange an inter-disciplinary meeting after 12 weeks gestation so that information may be shared and a bespoke pre-birth plan agreed.

The suggestions set out above are simple, affordable, easily implemented and would be effective. Requiring the attendance of parents at first hearings should not be routine and certainly not imposed by designated family judges. Whilst there may be occasions when new mothers must attend a live hearing in person, the court should make such demands only where necessity dictates, taking into account the wishes of parents and the advice of those that know them.

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The right to protest

Speakers’ Corner, Hyde Park

A post about freedom of speech – protection, balance and proportionality

This week, with outpourings of grief following the death of Queen Elizabeth II, a minority of anti-Monarchists have had to bite their tongues, adjudging that now is not an appropriate moment to vent their political and social views. However some from the fanatical fringe, or the impetuous immature, have shown out with protests and insults that have offended a distressed nation. They have been arrested and removed. They have been silenced.

The eighteen articles in Schedule 1 Part 1 of the Human Rights Act 1989 provide a barrage of rights protected by law. In particular Article 10 provides for freedom of expression. The protection is not, however, unqualified.

The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

As a lawyer I cannot but imagine that the actions of police have been lawful in the present circumstances. The response from the Monarchists alone – including the swinging of fists – justified police action to prevent a breach of the peace. On the other hand libertarian commentators such as Brendan O’Neill writing in the Spectator have challenged the concept of silencing this minority, contending that their freedom of speech is ‘the most essential liberty’.

Of course that is to mount the right of a protester way above the interests of the general public that may not share their views. Whilst some of us might agree with O’Neill conceptually, where we depart is in the manner of exercise of protest. We have issues with the shouting of an obscenity, just as we do with the blocking of a motorway by protesters.

The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 has gone some way to amend the Public Order Act 1986, but both Acts failed to achieve a social balance between the protection of free speech and the prevention of harm.

That got me looking back to 1872 and the Parks Regulation Act which enshrined the right to protest at ‘Speakers’ Corner’, Hyde Park London. It built on the long-held right of those to be executed at Tyburn Gallows to make a final speech there before their hanging. In 1866 the Reform League, being locked out of the park, removed the railings so as to gain entry and by the next year Home Secretary Spencer Walpole resigned when police and troops declined to intervene against the protesters.

Perhaps Prime Minister Truss should consider new ways to protect the freedoms of thought and expression, whilst responding to the public desire for proportionality of protest. Designating safe protected protest venues, as was done at Hyde Park, might go some way to achieve this, as would the recognition of prescribed methods of protest that balance free speech with public order?

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Homily to the Hybrid

A post about hybrid hearings, their value (and limitations?)

It seems that the judges cannot wait for the ‘return to the old normal’ – that of live hearings, with parties and witnesses being expected to attend in person.

For my part, I am at a loss to understand the reason or see the purpose of this decision. Maybe it is to do with the exercise of judicial power and control? Having the witness but feet away gives the questioner an overbearing advantage. Virtual and hybrid hearings are much more egalitarian with parties and witnesses connecting from ‘their space’ rather than being corralled into a courtroom.

Could it be due to ineptitude – judges and their court staff being let down on failing links by inadequate technology and training?

Or perhaps it is simply a consequence of judicial incapacity to adapt – in the mistaken (and discredited) belief that it is essential to see the whites and moisture of a witness’ eyes in order to make a judgment on their veracity.

Recent benefits of virtual and hybrid hearings should not be underestimated. They permitted hearings to continue despite virus restrictions; and for the first time, they enabled witnesses and other court users to connect just for the time that they are needed. Has anyone estimated the cost of huge tranches of time wasted by parties, witnesses and advocates as they travel to and from distant court centres, only to be kept waiting by judges, or vice versa?

I am unpersuaded by the need for a witness to be physically in a courtroom to guage their reliability. Why should a courtroom-intimidated witness be more accurate, reliable or honest than one who connects from their home or solicitor’s office? Does our intuition as observers start and stop with physical presence? And what place does ‘gut feeling’ based on observation have in any court judgment?

For over two years we have made such progress in managing remote hearings that to abandon the idea is wasteful of skills and experience. Properly instructed, advocates can manage all interlocutory processes online, with parties attending remotely if desired. For final hearings, the option should be to attend in person or not, knowing that equal weight will be given to evidence that is live or remote.

Might an answer lay in funding, and some forward planning by the Court Service? Had it been provided with quality, twenty first century technology in properly adapted court rooms, giant flat screens, voice activated switching coupled with a robust video platform, things might have been different. Perhaps then we would have been embracing the hybrid hearing as our future, rather than seeing them simply as a sticking plaster for social distancing?

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Advice for applicants: position – Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

A post following the sudden departure of Dame Cressida Dick, to advise her successor/s

I commenced my Metropolitan Police service as a young constable in March 1974 and ended as a police sergeant in September 1978 when I read for the Bar. It was a short period of service, but spanned the tenure of two commissioners – 19th Sir Robert Mark and 20th Sir David McNee, only one of whom I met.

In those days the Metropolitan Police Commissioner was distant both from the public, and members of the police service. I encountered Robert Mark on only a couple of occasions when commended for arrests. Contrast today, when the office of Commissioner is held under micro-scrutiny by serving officers, politicians, pressure groups and the public at large.

But, to the point of this post, what now that the 28th Commissioner, Dame Cressida Dick has been forced from office? How do we replace the first openly female LBGT holder of the office, one that has the reputation of being creative, transformational and popular in policing circles?

Albeit well remunerated, the job of Commissioner is a poison chalice. One need only glance over previous appointments to see that each tenure is but one self-generated crisis away from extinction.

The 27th Commissioner, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, after losing the confidence of his internal staff, was heavily criticised for contradicting PM David Cameron by saying that carrying an ISIS flag by a father and daughter in Parliament Square was ‘not necessarily the worst thing in the world’ and should not lead to an automatic arrest.

The 26th Commissioner, Paul Stephenson was also the subject of criticism just before the press phone-hacking scandal, after it emerged that he had received free hospitality at a health spa run by a former editor of the News of the World.

My fellow Hendon Police College friend, 25th Commissioner, Ian Blair faced multiple criticisms that led to his resignation in 2008, finally saying after Mayor Boris Johnson had withdrawn his support, “without the Mayor’s backing I do not think I can continue”.

Whilst the 24th Commissioner, John Stevens managed to exit unscathed, the 23rd Commissioner Paul Condon faced ‘institutional racism’ findings in the Macpherson report following the Stephen Lawrence killing.

It seems that the demands of policing the metropolis in recent times have mostly exceeded the capabilities of a single commissioner. However, if we search back to the formation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 we get a clue for an answer to the problem.

Many think wrongly that policing in London was set up by the 19th Century Home Secretary, Sir Robert Peel. But ask any constable fresh from training school and they will tell you that Sir Robert actually appointed two Commissioners jointly to form the first force, ex army officer Charles Rowan and barrister Richard Maine. It was not until 1855 that a sole Commissioner took charge.

The role of a single Commissioner must be the loneliest job in the country. Prime Ministers have their cabinet, Monarchs their Counsellors of State; but the Metropolitan Police Commissioner is totally isolated and unprotected from the savage political dogs of Home Secretary and London Mayor.

The idea of two Commissioners was an inspired choice in 1829, and may now hold the key to future police regulation. Unlike deputies, who tend to be handbag carriers for the main office holder; or the muddle of Deputy Assistant Commissioners that form a viper’s nest of competing interests hardly committed to the support of their principal – joint officer holders work together, collaborating and innovating following careful discussion and agreement.

My advice to Cressida’s successor is – contact your best policing mate, send in a joint application and split the £280,000 salary between you. The job of Commissioner, one of strategic command, is totally suited to joint tenure, and both of you together will hopefully sail clear of unforced errors, political criticism and public censure.

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Answer my call

Judge Bruce Schroeder in the Kyle Rittenhouse trial Friday, Nov. 12, 2021. (Mark Hertzberg /Pool Photo via AP)

A post about the use of mobile technology in the courtroom, and whether the time has come to review this?

Lucy Reed, in her excellent, award-winning blog ‘Pink Tape‘, addresses the vexed question concerning the use of mobile phones in court, commenting, ‘within a minute of the judge having explained phones weren’t allowed in court…we all had to consult those phones in order to check our diaries to set the next hearing date.’ It is a fascinating read, one that I would recommend.

Her post got me thinking how courts remain ‘behind the game’ when it comes to technological innovation. As Pink Tape points out, lawyers are habitually connecting through mobile communications anyway, whether for advocates’ meetings, at remote interim hearings, or when cross-examining experts over a video link. It is not just via emails between the lawyers whilst in court – advocates frequently link by WhatsApp messaging to ensure seamless communication during hearings. So what is the particular problem that marginalises the use of mobile communication in court?

I suspect the issue is threefold. First is one of covert recording.

When recording technology emerged, courts stayed behind the times. Perhaps this was understandable, for whilst we had the technology to record, we were a long way off having the ability to transcribe. But that position changed: the stenographers were fired and audio recording took their place. Now, every hearing is digitally recorded using the court controlled system.

The fact that we have an authoritative recording – call it the master copy – should mean that we could be less precious about authorising the use of other audio recordings. A good example relates to the medieval practice of handwritten notes of evidence, frequently shown to be inadequate. And why the block on recordings of meetings and interim hearings? Might now be the right time for judges to exercise discretion as to the use of recording, so long as rules relating to contempt on publication are clear?

A second reason for banning mobile phones relates to the disclosure of witness evidence.

Recently, I witnessed the issue of a sworn witness in court communicating with others yet to give evidence. The witness had been warned not to share any information concerning their testimony, but breached the warning when they phoned other family members.

In truth, such problems will arise whether or not technology is involved. Maybe the answer here lies not in across-the-board prohibition on phones, but judges making very clear contempt warnings in situations in which sharing proceedings will be visited with serious sanction?

A third issue is interruption. Is there anything more disconcerting in the course of a witness’ evidence than the sound of an iPhone default ringtone or Nokia tune?

Our recent experience with remote hearings has made us inured to interruptions of many kinds – the doorbell ringing, a child wandering in, or a dog barking from another room. None of it is fatal to the evidence being given or the dignity of the proceedings. We manage it as best we can, and live with it as an unintended consequence of remote hearings.

With the right sort of warnings given at the right time, interruptions may be managed if not eliminated. How much better to receive an important update on the evidence – than to ban the tool that receives it?

Maybe we should review the whole question of balance of privacy, confidentiality, publication and sharing of information that arises in and from a court hearing? Perhaps this is another job for Lucy Reed’s transparency project? Sorry to give you yet another job, Lucy!

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Fill in a Form

form

A post for fellow legal professionals, and everyone who dislikes bureaucracy

“I would treat it as you would a path through the woods. You must follow it certainly so as to reach your end. But you must not let the path become too overgrown. You must cut out the dead wood and trim off the side branches, else you will find yourself lost in thickets and brambles”.

The Rt Hon Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls.

Today, as I approach the Combined Court Centre at Newcastle Upon Tyne, ahead up the steps from Broad Chare, snakes a line of court users – parties, witnesses, jurors, social workers and others. They are queuing to pass through security.

I have a phone app that will supposedly permit instant professional access to the court, so I cross the queue to join a group of phone-holding advocates. In turn, we press a large green button on the wall and present our phone app for hand-held scanning of our image. If the pictures match, we are ushered in. If not, it is back to the long queue to wait our turn. (Interestingly, whilst authorising admittance, the single-purpose app has no role on exit!)

Today, I am listed before a district judge, so I take the long corridor that leads to the hearing rooms. Along the way, every seat is taken, every corner pressed with litigants. There I join another queue.  The reclusive clerk will emerge after taking a form to a judge, demand my case number, the number of the court, my place in the list, then copy my name to a form on a clip board. I will retreat to be swallowed up in the throng.

But, before I do so, I must pick up another form, for on this form I am to write the names and status of each advocate in my case. This will be handed to the judge so that they know who I am and why I am are there.

Later, after the ordeal of visual recognition and multiple form-filling, I will complete the most important form – one to ensure that I am paid. And for this purpose we require a further form (numbered 506) that has been signed and certified on the day by the judge.

Is it just me that is frustrated and dismayed by the Twentieth Century approach to present day problem; a single case that requires five separate identity-establishing procedures? Contrast entry to the health club that is effected (and billed) from a camera image taken on approach to a turnstile. On the right day, a happy birthday tune is even played to welcome the passing of another year.

CourtServe.net contains the live listings for all of the nation’s courts. But that is it: a twenty year old, one-dimensional resource that nobody has thought to update and extend.

Imagine this. Before arriving at court we simply log online to our CourtServe case listing. There, we record our name and whom we represent. Automatically this links to our ‘online diaries’ to authenticate our attendance. If we need time for discussions, we can note the fact. When the list of advocates is complete, our case may be digitally called for hearing before a well-informed judge.

Court security, case management, and professional fee payment all in one place. Smile and ignore; or discuss?

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Advocacy – a low in Family Courts, or a sign of the times?

bald faced

A post about family court advocacy and the choices we should consider

After 37 years of practice at the Bar – out of touch? I hope not as much as you would expect. Moved with the times? Now, here you can judge.

Today’s blog concerns family court advocacy.

I have not always been a family practitioner. There was a time – up to 1997 – when my practice involved largely criminal defence and regulatory work. After a diet of inner and outer London Crown Courts, and of course, the Central Criminal Court, I moved to the North Eastern Circuit to spend my time in the Crown Courts of Yorkshire. It follows that my advocacy skills were seated in the demands and honed by the constraints of plain speaking criminal advocacy.

The process was simple. Examination involved asking questions. Non-leading questions. The simpler, the better. Each question could, and frequently was prefaced with the words “who, what, where, when, how, why”. The aim of the question was to elicit a reply, and the reply was the evidence. Oral evidence was the currency of the court.

Cross examination permitted leading questions – where a direction or suggested answer occurs naturally within the question. Previous inconsistent statements could be put to a witness and tested by questioning – “here, you said ‘a’; now you say ‘b’; why the difference?”

Beyond those simple rules, we did not stray. To do so would result in the judge stopping line of questioning and the defective question prevented. Save for older silks, most complied, and we got along fine.

Whilst the admissibility of affidavits and statutory declarations has always been permitted, there came a time when pre-prepared statements were encouraged, and later required. In civil proceedings, the statements were to stand as the witness’ evidence, and it would be on their written statement that they would be tested in cross examination.

As a process, this lasted ‘but five judicial minutes in a long legal landscape’. Advocates used the statements to prepare the ground, rather than setting it. So it is rare today that witnesses are called and tendered on the basis of their written statement. Instead, advocates track through already deposed facts and recollections, and judges sit silently permitting this to happen, as if they hear the revelation for the first time.

But the main current transgression in advocacy skills, is the use by advocates of ‘comment’ dressed elaborately as a question. We all know that there is a massive difference between questions, assertions and comments. The first is designed to elicit evidence, and the others are an argumentative measure of the questioner’s opinion.

Habitually in family courts, lines of questioning are loaded with comment, or flung at witnessed as assertions. Some practitioners may say this is simply to ‘set the scene’ for a question. Mostly, the scene does not need to be set, and the assertive comment from an advocate is entirely out of place where the judge has read the evidence bundle. Maybe this is the problem – maybe the judges haven’t and the advocates are seeking to describe the case to the judge, rather than question the witness on their evidence?

The more judges permit it to occur, the more it happens, to the point of normalising the ‘assertive-comment question’. The clarity of the process is not the only casualty; another is a diminution of the skill of the advocate. As opinion and evidence blur, so does the original integrity of the purpose and function of questioning witnesses. Witnesses are not simply confronted – which is good; but bullied, confused and invited to argument – which is cruel, unnecessary and to my view, unprofessional.

The flaw now appears ubiquitous in family courts, as family judges sit back and listen to comment-laden questions fired repetitively, to the point that when it comes to closing submissions (or comment) there is not a fresh comment to make.

Some suggest that the family courts have ‘floated away from the mainstream civil legal process’, with altered rules of evidence and procedure. Yes, family courts have a special, human job to do -one that frequently requires a more informal approach -but the casualties of free-for-all questioning are extensive, not least the skill and ability of advocates to question without comment.

With thanks to Mark Anderson for use of his cartoon  

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Its my money. Trust me!

Wont-Get-My-Money-400x234

A post dealing with the cost of divorce, especially when it comes to financial arrangements

Over the final half of my 37 years as a barrister in private practice, I have been arguing over money.

Not mine, I hasten to add, but other people’s. In particular, divorcing spouses or cohabitees. There comes a time after almost every separation when two people who have lived together and loved, start to argue about the spoils. Those that can afford it rush to a solicitor or direct access barrister and commence battle. Those that cannot pay may chose to go it alone.

Either way, they have embarked on a battle from which there is little respite – until they run out of money, of energy, or are crushed at court in a final hearing.

But the purpose of this blog is not to bemoan honest,hard-working people spending inordinate amounts of their money on lawyers and in courts. It is to examine the fundamental flaws of financial remedy proceedings (as the financial arrangements are called in court).

My first observation is prosaically procedural. How is it that going to court to argue financial splitting of assets can remotely be justified? The cost of this process starts at £12,000 for the couple, and soars to a dizzy £100-120,000 in more complex cases. In J v J the parties managed to rack up £920,000 in costs between them, much to the judicial amazement and displeasure of Mr Justice Mostyn. Do they get a return on their investment? J v J didn’t; and generally, the chances are – not.

Readers of my earlier blogs will recall my commentary on the alternatives of mediation and arbitration, which I will not repeat here. Guidance by a single expert makes sense, assuming the expert knows what a judge would do, and that both parties agree to be bound by the outcome. There is, of course, the other ‘questionable’ alternative of splitting at the outset by way of pre or post-nuptual agreement.

My main concern here is to do with the philosophy of division where children are involved. In fact, my problem goes further – to question of ‘ownership’ and ‘responsibility’.

The financial wars that I have witnessed rarely focus on the children. Yes, this may be the court’s first consideration when it comes to making an order, but the children seem to remain ‘bit players’ in the battles, unless they are to be used as weapons to secure a greater share of the booty for one of the parents.

So, what would happen if we changed the rules?

Imagine this. When two people decide that they are to have children, they would do so in the knowledge that they forfeit ownership of property to them? How would that be?

Simple. The law would deem that all matrimonial property vested immediately in trust for the children, and that each parent became a trustee for the child. Rather than children being ‘the first consideration’ for a court, a child or children would be deemed to be the beneficial owners of all of the property. There would no longer be the ‘divvy up’ entitlement of assets to to each parent; there would be an appropriate of provision for the parents’ immediate needs and no more. The rest would be managed exclusively to provide everything that their child would need through to the age of 21.

What a glorious world that would be – children placed, where they deserve and need to be – at the centre of decision making as the beneficiary and responsibility of their parents’ endeavours.

But will such ever come to pass? Of course not. We have neither the imagination to prioritise children over parental greed, nor the legal system to oversee it.

Instead, we will continue to subsidise the lifestyle of lawyers (of which I am one). But, long may it continue – for after all, what value the future of our children?

Whilst an advert may appear at the foot, this blog is neither monetarised, nor endorsing any product

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Gun culture and Gangland. Who bears the Risk?

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A post reflecting on post Sandy Hook incidents of gun crime and what should be done about it

Readers will be aware of this blogger’s preoccupation with guns as instruments of death. Its right to say that, as a former certificate holder, I was never fully comfortable with owning a firearm. As an English barrister dealing with a barrage of firearms cases for several police authorities, I became even more sensitive to the issues of ownership, use and abuse.

Shootings in American schools have resulted in recent impassioned gun pleas from President Obama. I glanced at the Wikipedia entry – yes, it takes some time to scroll down from 1927 to 2015 – to find that the Umpqua Community College shooting, with the loss of 10 lives, 20 casualties, and innumerable families distraught, was not in fact the most recent school shooting in the USA. Since then there have been two further school deaths in the States, and since my Sandy Hook blog, 19 further incidents comprising 38 deaths.

The US gun lobby, in the form of the National Rifle Association, however, maintain their resistance. shoot 1It seems that Americans are unable to release themselves from the belief that guns in the hands of civilian are more protective than offensive.

Restricting the lawful possession of handguns here in the UK after 17 deaths at Dunblane, has been of massive value in saving lives and changing public opinion. The Great British public have little issue with the fact that handguns are no longer permitted outside gun shooting clubs.

It has not, however, shut off the availability of guns. Greater Manchester Police have seized 30 unlicensed weapons this year. Now, in yet a gangland feud, Jayne Hickey, a mother and her 7 year old child have been shot.

I have previously blogged about the question of rights to own firearms here in the UK, and the need for some legislative change.

Whilst unlawful weapons – especially handguns – will be imported from time to time, the gangland weapon of choice is frequently a simple shotgun, the barrel shortened for ease of concealment, and blast effect. There is no need to import these weapons, they are here already.

Whether shotgun or handgun, the most recent shootings beg the question “What is the source of these weapons?” Until we address the manufacture, procurement and recording of weapons internationally, we will face incidents like these.  Perhaps, with regard to the ‘home gun market’, now is the time to insist (in addition to a gun amnesty) that every registered certificate holder has compulsory insurance against all of the implications of their weapon entering the wrong hands?

Culture Casualty

A post about lunch, reflecting on the death of the Bar Mess

Yesterday, I found myself reminiscing about ‘the old days at the Bar’ – as one does after 36 long years in private practice.

Unusually, eleven lawyers were beached together in the small advocates’ room at York Family Court Centre whilst Judge F, the single judge, battled with a massive list, complicated by all manner of legal conundrums. I permitted the wash of sound to lap against my consciousness. If I needed confirmation that I was in a family court the words were ‘children’, ‘mum’, dad’ and the odd ‘grandchild’ provided it.  Ahead of me was a flash of red lining from a young advocates new suit, a blue silk scarf wafted beyond on a peg, files were piled on tables and window ledges, and a suitcases staggered in a crazy parking lot by the lockers.  These were the true signs of the family court.

But there was no mention of ‘lunch’.

These days, as the plastic forks and boxes and vacuum packed sandwiches join the cardboard coffee and aluminium flasks on the advocates’ tables, there is no thought of communal ritual or routine. At one time, courts would have risen almost simultaneously, coughing advocates up and out to join each other at ‘the mess’ – the legal ritual daily lunch.

Here on the North Eastern Circuit at Leeds, an entire centre row of tables in the advocates’ area would be cleared at noon and set for lunch, with meals served simultaneously by the waitress staff. When a jury had recently returned a verdict – and the day’s work completed, a bottle of burgundy may also appear. In Sheffield and Hull, this event was honed to a fine art by the court junior. Arriving at the selected pub or hotel, advocates would be greeted by door and waitress staff, and led to linen-dressed tables, pre-set with wine and flowers. Joined by the judges, lunch would last as long as they deemed proper, with occasional messages phoned from the corner booth to inform court staff that the judge was ‘unavoidably delayed’.

Some readers will read this with incredulity. Others, censoriously, sensing inappropriate practice and privilege. But, at the time, it provided the perfect setting for the real work of the Bar – communication.

Retiring from active practice at the Bar, HP’s recent observations  about ‘lunch’ were remarkably insightful – not surprising for those that knew HP’s innate perspicacity. She may read this and deprecate the linking of her remarks with historic excesses, for that is not what she meant. Her point (and mine) was simply that busy, overworked, over-stressed advocates needed an opportunity to unpack, talk, listen and reflect. Rather than taking home the stresses of unresolved conflict to unwitting families  – how much more appropriate to sit together as professionals, take lunch and chat things through?

These days the elegance of practice – whether as a barrister or solicitor of the Supreme Court – has been removed, stolen or simply evaporated with the passage of time. Mostly, we subsist as executives working in the law, festooned and remunerated by regulation. Like the judges before whom we appear, we have little or no ‘thinking time’. Last minute preparation of digital information requires instant responses and sees us enter courts with sometimes superficial grasp of the case in hand, and no later chance to reflect or discuss what we should have learned.

The system – whether imposed by Ministry of Justice, HM Court Service, Legal Aid Agency or merely present day structure of the professions – simply impoverishes our work rather than enhances it. The greater the pressure to deliver in the shortest possible time without reflection, the poorer the judgement, and the service that we deliver.

I say, “bring back lunch”, and breath new, old meaning into legal practice.

Arbitration revisited

A post about how arbitration may be the way forward for family financial disputes

Divorce Arbitration blog in April 2012  reflected on the first 40 divorce arbitrators appointed through the Institute of Family Arbitrators. Since then, the President Lord Justice Munby in S v S has given arbitration in financial remedy cases a massive boost. A final piece of the jigsaw has been thrown down on the table by Mr Justice Mostyn in J v J – a matter which I covered in the blog Scandalous Costs.

You don’t need to be clairvoyant to detect the future for financial remedy cases. With unacceptably escalating costs in adversarial court processes, coupled with the possibility of open justice through public courts, we are unlikely to continue to litigate many financial cases as we have done in the past. The alternatives may not be as I described in Solving Disputes, but there is a lot to commend the concept of private resolution.

So, how well placed are our northern regional centres – such as Manchester, Sheffield Leeds and Newcastle – to meet future demand for private arbitrations of disputes about family finances?

A handful of individual of regional practitioners have taken the plunge to qualify as financial remedy arbitrators, yet there has been no consistent policy to produce pairings, let alone teams within barrister’s chambers or solicitors’ practices. Further, we have developed no marketing arm to promote arbitration, or practice policy to bring arbitrators together.

The Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, as a regulatory body, can do so much – perhaps mainly for London based practitioners – but it hasn’t the reach to make a difference in the provinces, and market weight will not remedy this deficiency for some time to come.

This market sector is highly specialised, so it is unlikely to attract corporate players outside the current legal community of financial remedy practitioners. But that is not to say that the regional market cannot be absorbed by London collectives.

Now may be the time for northern financial remedy arbitrators to make changes – to be less reliant on the old systems of referral – and much more focused on direct marketing with a single regional dispute resolution centre. Lord Justice Munby is paving a way that we in the north would be remiss not to follow.

Community Justice – the ‘community court’ for 2015

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A post questioning why private family matters should be conducted in public courts

Today, the Stephen Twist Barrister blog is three years of age.

Back in January 2012, in the then ‘Dere Street Barristers Blog’, my first posting ‘Thirty Three Thesis Thirty Three  has stood the test of time. Lawyers’ fees and earnings reduced over the following three years;  the world did not end (as the Great Cycle of the Long Count predicted) on 21 December 2012; and my chambers survived a further three years.

My preoccu-prediction that mediation would develop apace was a sage guess – with ADR continuing to rise over three years in civil and family cases, and restorative solutions appearing increasingly in criminal processes. Perhaps my vision of paper-free practices was less visionary. Third party investment in the legal profession was an event that foretold of a trend. More prominent, direct access to the Bar has continued to provide an alternative to the ‘gold card’ spend.

As precursors for this blog, my increasingly present concerns about ‘court process’ resulted in a series of blogs relating to privatised courts, starting in May 2013 with Privatised Courts – where to, where from? The September blog Fit For Purpose, addressing the idea of private court hearings, proved very popular – to the point that it was passed off as the work of an infamous silk until the Bar Council caught up and exposed him. Although slightly off-piste, Party Animals published in February 2014 looked at alternative approaches to family court litigation. However, it was not until July 2014 that my blog got to grips with the prospect of Dispute Resolution Centres in Solving Disputes and Scandalous Costs in November 2014.

Michael Zuckerman, in his excellent article, The Experience of Dignity: Community Courts and the Future of the Criminal Justice System tells of the Red Hook Community Justice Centre in Brooklyn as a community court. Until I read his article, I had not heard of the 70 multi-jurisdictional community courts. The concept, reminiscent of Nils Christie’s paper Conflicts as Property, has significant merits. It returns justice to the community affected, and empowers rather than simply punishes.

So why, in Britain, do we not have such a centre? The economics make total sense. If reduction in offending is an objective, this is surely the way forward. Client and community satisfaction appear to be met exponentially by the project.

As a Youth Offending Panellist and trained restorative justice facilitator, I have seen first hand the benefits of alternative approaches to justice and conflict resolution. Now seems to be the perfect time to return conflict back to the community for repair, rather than to estreat it to the courts for punishment.

Scandalous Costs

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A post about the cost of divorce and whether the tax payer should pick up any part of the bill

Between 29 October and 5 November 2014, Mr Justice Mostyn heard a financial remedy dispute between two embattled divorcing parents.

Their home was worth £291k, a property portfolio worth £317k, pensions of £115k and two businesses valued at £2080k.

By the Financial Dispute Resolution appointment on 12 March 2014, they had spent £226k in costs.  However, eight months later on 6 November, their legal costs rose to a staggering £920k – nearly one third of their assets.

In another case, the current President of the Family Division (in 2008 as a High Court judge) spoke of excessive costs constituting to “a scandal which must somehow be brought under control“. In 2012 Lord Neuberger had a go at costs in his lecture to the Association of Costs Lawyers, saying that hourly billing confused “cost with value”.

To avoid “the grotesque leaching of costs”, like Lord Neuberger before him, Mostyn J proposes fixed costs legal services to replace hourly billing, together with costs caps – and is to send the issue back to the President of the Family Courts for action.

This blogger has always been ambivalent towards hourly rate billing, believing that ‘time spent’ varies according to expertise. The lazy or inept lawyer can spend considerable time doing what the expert will do in an instant. With hourly billing, one is overpaid, whilst the other is inadequately rewarded.

But has the judiciary really grasped the nettle of costs?

The simple flaw lies deeper, in the fact that two firms of litigators, whose interests are served by protracting conflict, are permitted to take their clients into headlong battle, for which both the public and their clients pay at an hourly rate.

What do they pay for? Frequently, the ‘what is there?’ – the identity and value or the assets – is not the problem. Where divorcing couples can’t agree, they get an independent valuation. The real issue is to determine ‘what to do’ with what is there; and that is the job for their barrister.

The impenetrable form E – the court designed document intended to set out a financial picture probably fails in every regard, other than to raise rancour. What is needed is a simple schedule of assets, liabilites and income. After all, the court will attend to these (as did Mostyn J) – not the aspirations and wishes of the parties, nor tactical positions crafted by their solicitors. Why, then, should the preparation (and possible agreement) of such a schedule not be made a pre-requisite of a financial remedy claim?

What to do with the assets is frequently fairly obvious. Up and down the country District Judges hear contested cases in a matter of hours and give extempore judgments immediately following the evidence. More frequently, matters resolve at the financial dispute resolution stage when a judge (without hearing evidence) makes sage suggestions.

Why the battle lines? Why two lawyers and an adversarial process? What is wrong with simple experienced and impartial analysis to help resolve these issues? That the parties won’t agree is simply an excuse by an over-priced, unwieldy adversarial system – made possible and perpetuated by the court process.

Regrettably, what Mr Justice Mostyn did not evaluate was the significant cost to the public of hearing the case – numerous appearances before the lower court, a Deputy District Judge, Judge Bancroft’s salary, Mostyn J’s own salary over seven days, the Family Court and High Court buildings, court staff, heating and lighting – to deal with a ‘delinquent’ couple who had spent £920,000 with their lawyers.

How bizarre is it having public courts dedicated to this massively costly process, paid for at huge cost to taxpayers?

Farnham Puppy Farm murders

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ACC Stuart Cundy, Surrey Police – Photo courtesy of bbc.co.uk

A post that examines whether gun control needs to be reviewed in the light of Farnham

23 February 2014, Farnham in Surrey, Christine Lee and her daughter Lucy were shot dead by John Lowe.

The weapon was a simple shot gun. It, together with other guns had been taken from him by police in March 2013 following concerns raised by Christine Lee’s other daughter Stacy Banner. By July 2013 they were returned.

John Lowe was Christine Lee’s partner. His cache of seven shotguns were kept by him at Keepers Cottage Stud under his shotgun certificate. At the time of the killing he was 82 years of age. His long-term relationship with Christine Lee had been marred by years of conflict. The case had an uncanny resemblance to that of Michael Atherton.

Today, John Lowe was convicted of murder and awaits sentence. After the verdict, this blogger was placed on stand-by by BBC Radio 4 PM programme. As matters progressed, Kevin Hurley, the Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey agreed to comment, and unconvincingly, whilst deflecting on ‘cuts’ to the service, blamed Surrey Police staff a ‘flawed decision that failed to meet national standards’.

I see it differently. Time may indeed tell that clerical officers in an under-resourced office at Surrey Police Headquarters made mistakes. A head of department may be disciplined. National standards (which the blogger finds convoluted) may not have been followed.

But the essence of the problem lies not in the guidelines, but the rules that require the return of weapons to a certificate holder.

The debate has not yet matured to this level of examination, but under current firearms law, the possession of a shotgun is a ‘right’ not a ‘privilege’. An applicant does not have to ‘earn’ the opportunity to hold a weapon, nor to demonstrate anything other than it will be locked up securely.  A shotgun certificate “shall be granted” unless the applicant is a prohibited person (for example a known criminal who has served time), is demonstrated not to have a good reason to possess a weapon, or is shown to be “a danger to the public safety or the peace”.

The Farnham puppy farm dilema is not as uncommon as first appears. It’s just that fortuitously, the horror perpetrated by John Lowe is extremely rare.

Throughout police services in the UK, talented, informed and experienced firearms officers will tell you of cases where weapons have been anxiously returned to certificate holders, simply because the rules do not permit any other course.

Courts (usually at first instance the justices), interpret the law just as they are required to do – strictly. When the burden is on a firearms officer to demonstrate that an applicant has no good purpose or will be a danger to the public or the peace, the fact that the applicant has amassed an arsenal of weapons and wanders their neighbourhood dressed in military fatigues is largely irrelevant.

Contrary to Nigel Farage’s ill-judged comments back in January 2014, the 1997 restrictions following Dunblane did not go far enough. Then, and now, the criteria for possessing a firearm of any kind should be changed to one of privilege, and not of right.

The gun lobby will squeal; those who are committed to individual freedoms will protest; but neither group tend to be the victim of gun crime. It is the Christine Lees and the Susan McGoldricks that commonly carry the death penalty for our unruly rules.

Solving Disputes

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A post to examine whether dispute resolution centres could work to support justice

Readers will be familiar with my preoccupation with alternative dispute resolution – especially if you flash back to my postings here – ‘Privatised Courts – where to, where from‘ and ‘Fit for Purpose‘.

With a civil court £100m deficit last year, court fees have had to rise (in one case by 216%). Such rises impact on access to justice for many people. Yet the court issue fee is the least of a litigant’s problems. The biggest is arguably their legal costs at the conclusion of the case.

The only answer to massive legal bills (and the real danger of adverse costs orders against unsuccessful litigants)  is to bypass the legal process altogether; although whilst the courts are open for business, and litigation lawyers strive to make money, this option is not currently realistic.

I have been impressed by recent developments in restorative justice, where those in conflict are encouraged and helped to sort things out between themselves in a civilised way. It is now acknowledged that there are almost no disputes that need to be excluded from this restorative process. Facilitators are arranging meetings in homicide and rape cases, and in long-standing conflicts that have been running for years. Even cases involving highly dangerous perpetrators, those with mental illness, and with children and young people are often deemed suitable for facilitation.

In my view, this is the vision for the future – lawyers and courts standing back, to allow for a more proportionate and appropriate resolution.

It will require a new role for law and for lawyers. Legal rules are there not simply to be known to lawyers and applied by judges in binding outcomes; but should be made available to guide those in dispute towards sensible compromises. The law should act as a framework for a well-ordered life, rather than as technical and incomprehensible set of rules to be adjudicated upon.

Speak to anyone who has been involved in legal processes and they will tell you that justice is always partial. This is because, whilst courts are supposed to be brokers of truth and justice, decisions arise from balances of proof and evidence, and judgments are frequently arbitrary. Once in the legal process, the litigants surrender all real power over outcomes, and remain in the hands of one individual, with that person’s limitations and prejudices. Not all judges are good judges, and not all of their decisions are correct. And to correct a poor decision by appeal takes time and often a considerable amount of money.

Firms of lawyers and barristers’ chambers should offer and provide proper ‘Dispute Resolution Centres’ – a place to which the protagonists can turn for considered and proportionate advice, and from which they are not expelled into an adversarial forum. Joint legal opinions and advice would form the first step helping the ‘parties’ to understand a framework for settlement. After that would come the facilitation stage – not necessarily managed by and restricted to the lawyers – but perhaps overseen by expert dispute brokers. And if issues remained, those in dispute would access simple adjudication by way of joint expert decision or arbitration.

Dispute Resolution Centres could operate on the basis of fixed fees without ‘issue costs’, teams of warring layers, and vitriolic letters – providing a ‘one-stop-shop’ to contain and resolve conflict.

For those that doubt the concept, remember, if lawyers do not take this initiative now, others may do so to their exclusion.

End of life – now await Lord Falconer’s bill on 18 July in the House of Lords

tony nicklinson

A post dealing with the issue of assisted dying and a change in the law

The long awaited judgment in R v Nicklinson has been handed down in the Supreme Court. Here is a link to the YouTube video.

Readers will note that the judgment comes after considerable deliberation by  a massive nine  Supreme Court Judges – an extremely rare occurrence. It follows that this is one of the most important judgments of recent times, and is worthy of a careful and comprehensive read.

Dignity in Dying summarise the 366 paragraphs of judgment thus:

Summary of the case outcomes

Martin case

None of the nine justices ordered the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to clarify the prosecuting policy on assisted suicide in relation to healthcare professionals. However, Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, in particular, made it clear that the justices expect the DPP to look again at her policy in the light of their concerns and comments, and to amend it as she sees fit.

This is, in particular, to address a clear contrast between what the prosecuting policy actually says about healthcare professionals and assisted suicide, and the interpretation given to it by the DPP’s legal counsel during the court hearing on her express instruction (this was essentially agreeing with Lord Judge’s interpretation in his decision on the case at the Court of Appeal).

Nicklinson/Lamb case

Whilst there was no declaration of incompatibility, several of the justices indicated that they think the court could (depending on the application before it) declare section 2 of the Suicide Act incompatible with Article 8 ECHR rights in the future if Parliament does not amend it.

Lord Neuberger, Lord Wilson and Lord Mance accept that, in the right case and at the right time, it would be open to the Supreme Court to make a declaration that section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 is incompatible with the right to respect for private life protected by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, they would prefer that Parliament have an opportunity of investigating, debating and deciding upon the issue before a court decides whether or not to make such a declaration.

Lady Hale and Lord Kerr would make a declaration of incompatibility now. Lord Kerr put matters simply:

“If one may describe the actual administration of the fatal dose as active assistance and the setting up of a system which can be activated by the assisted person as passive assistance, what is the moral objection to a person actively assisting someone’s death, if passive assistance is acceptable? Why should active assistance give rise to moral corruption on the part of the assister (or, for that matter, society as a whole), but passive assistance not? In both cases the assister’s aid to the person who wishes to die is based on the same conscientious and moral foundation. That it is that they are doing what the person they assist cannot do; providing them with the means to bring about their wished-for death. I cannot detect the moral distinction between the individual who brings a fatal dose to their beloved’s lips from the person who sets up a system that allows their beloved to activate the release of the fatal dose by the blink of an eye”.

Is  the judgment the ‘yellow card’ to our legislature; or simply indicative of the Supreme Court judges being too cautious – despite the weight of public opinion concerning their moral duty?

The Assisted Dying Bill brought by Lord Falconer is due for its first reading in the House of Lords on 18 July 2014. The majority of Supreme Court judges have sent a clear message to the legislature – ‘whilst we will not interfere now, should the law not be clarified by new legislation, we may’.

Party Animals

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photo of Sir James Munby, President of the Family Division, courtesy of Brian Smith for the Telegraph

A further post dealing with putting children first in family proceedings

“Going to court about your children is almost as bad as accepting an invitation from Jeremy Kyle…you should have sat down quietly together and sorted it. Instead you go for broke and destroy your last bit of dignity in a courtroom drama?

Strong words, (I hasten to add, not from the President of the Family Division) and amusing in their invective; but containing that trace of truth that harbours an important point.

If anyone was to invent a process that was better designed to fan the flames of conflict and at times humiliate the protagonists, they may be hard pushed to beat the current ‘family court system’. Take two people who are at loggerheads, a judge who ‘has better things to do’, bring in two lawyers with their jerry cans of publicly funded fuel, strike a match and you’re sure of a big blaze. If you are legally aided, the taxpayer gets to pay for your day in court, and if you are not-so-sponsored, you can also add in a huge bill for all the damage that is sown and reaped.

For over thirty years I have played my part as a barrister in these cases. Often, there are no winners – apart from the lawyers. The adults leave court with the compromise they could or should have agreed many months before, and the children pick up the emotional tab of their parents’ conflict.

In my previous blogs I have explored the role of mediation to tame the tempest. Glance back to see my ‘mediation musings’. But in this blog, I want to explore the question of why we allow (and frequently require) the adult players to be the drivers of litigation concerning their children.

The Children Act 1989 was intended to put children first. Maybe it did, but the legislators did not seize the stinging nettle as to ‘who should manage’ competing claims. In 1989, the adversarial system was still in full flight, even in children cases, and family advocates were rated on being a “good fighter”, “doughty opponent”, or “a determined advocate”. It would have been unconscionable to remove from parents their cherished ‘party status’ through which they could both commence proceedings and seek to control them as litigators.

Now the climate has changed. The courts have felt the effect of global warming and frequently turn on the air conditioning, or even the sprinklers to cool the temperature of conflict. The Children and Families Bill seeks to remove some of the more divisive concepts concerning private law orders. So, is the right time to take that extra step – and withdraw party status from the protagonists?

Envisage a system where, when an issue arises in relation to the care or management of a child, the court is notified, and appoints a ‘children’s guardian’ as a matter of course.

Rather than allowing the adults to rush through the doors of the court, the guardian would mediate between the parties, aiming for the middle ground that is so often adored by judges. Where agreement was possible, it would be recorded as an agreement and submitted to the court as endorsed in AI v MT and re-affirmed in S v S.

Should agreement not prove possible, the guardian’s solicitor, owing an equal duty to the child and the court, would take over the whole case management. One of their tasks would be to obtain statements from the parents setting out their concerns, positions and requests. The parents /grandparents /extended family members would all remain witnesses, having a right to have their voice heard, but not to manage and control the case. Only in public law cases where serious allegations were made against a parent would the question of party status arise.

In the absence of party agreement, the Guardian’s advocate would present the contested issue to the court, calling the parents as relevant witnesses. That which had already been agreed could be outlined, and the remainder decided by the district judge.

Of course, we would have to move away from the adversarial process, and that would require cultural and legislative changes. This may already be awaiting in the wings with the advent of the Single Family Court. We would also need proper funding of guardians and their solicitors. But the saving of replicated costs of party status for parents would probably pay for a pretty good service.

The requirements of efficiency and institutional functionality would probably rule out CAFCASS as a service provider, yet with a large pool of funded, professionally regulated, independent guardians, this problem could be overcome.

European Convention articles 6 or 8 may be cited as an issue, but  the European Court in Rosalba Alassini & Ors v Telecom Italia SpA & Ors, a endorsed the introduction of compulsory mediation as a preliminary step to litigation. Here, the facilitative role of the Guardian would be a preliminary step before the right to be heard by the court.

Do you agree that the change is a timely and necessary step on the road to managing both public and private law issues competently and proportionately, keeping the child on centre stage?

But what about the poor lawyers who would lose work? …..Yes, you have a point there.

The relationship between the Bar and the Bench

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In January two years ago in Family Proceedings on the Move I raised an issue about the requirement for advocates to draft court orders.  In July last year in The Headmaster’s SlipperI had cause to revisit the topic in the light of the ‘Submission of Orders in the Single Family Court’ direction.

It is now established practice that the advocates in a case will be responsible for drafting the majority of court orders within tight time-scales, so relieving both the judge and the court service who otherwise would prepare and ‘type it up’. Only those of my era will appreciate fully what a sea-change in responsibility and time this produces. Advocates, who formerly strolled away from court for lunch – their job done – now spend hours in drafting and agreeing the order. Mostly, this work falls outside remunerated time. In other words, the preparation of orders is a pro bono contribution.

As of the 17 March 2014, should Advocacy Forms not be signed by judges on the day of hearing,  Newcastle Combined Court has stated that it will refuse to pass them to Judges for signature. Instead advocates will be required to make an appointment with the Judge (probably prior to court commencing) where the Judge will consider the matter and listen to the advocate’s representations as to why this wasn’t done at the conclusion of the case before leaving court.

The probability will be that the judge did not stay long enough at the conclusion of a case for the information required on the form to be added, and it to be handed in for signature on the day.

Yet it occurs to the blogger that this is yet another example of ‘the administration of advocates’ by the court.

The Advocacy Form was always a flawed concept, proving nothing that could not be better obtained from more reliable, existing sources – a set of instructions, an up-to-date index and a witness list provide all of the information that is needed. The ludicrous issue of a judge certifying start and finish times can, if needed, be spot checked by reference to the court file.

A senior member of the Bar has recently observed that where the court service lose court orders and bundles in a case they will now be required to ‘make an appointment with her and she will consider whether to provide them with another copy’. I agree with her; yet this brilliant and witty ripost shows just how far we as advocates are being pushed by ‘the system’ away from our old collaborative relationship with judges.

With the Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates appointing judges as ‘graders of advocates’, the historic relationship between the Bar and the bench is now up-for-grabs. Judges and advocates are being manipulated and tied by the court service and government into a new web of bureaucracy. At what point will judicial discretion in relation to the drawing of court orders, the completion of Advocacy Forms, the grading of advocates – and most certainly many other issues – be totally removed, to be replaced by ‘management strategies’?

Mediation and Private Law Update

Family-Law

After one of the hottest days of the year so far, and being parboiled at court, chambers, or in the office, it was always a ‘big ask’ to expect a crowd for the latest of the Dere Street Barristers Family Team Lecture Series.

However, Ross Lee on Family Mediation, and Karen Lennon’s Private Law Update (together with two CDP) proved to be more than a sufficient draw.

Yesterday afternoon’s session was held at the Royal York Hotel, right in the centre of York and within jogging distance of Dere Street Barristers South premises in Toft Green.  From the windows of the Crown Room, the Yorkshire Wheel provided an elevating backdrop to this fascinating lecture.

Ross Lee opened the proceedings with a potted history of the developments in mediation – from the early 1990’s of Lord Irvine and Lord Woolf:   Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS Trust (2004) EWCA Civ 576 – to ADS Aerospace v EMS Global Tracking (2012) EWHC 2904. It rapidly became clear that family mediation, from its tentative start, is now becoming central to the process of resolving disputes concerning both children and finances.

Naturally for a Family Group Lecture, Ross Lee’s principal focus was on the development in family law – addressing the contact activity direction to attend a Mediation Information and Assessment Meeting (MIAM) under s11A Children Act 1989 and r.3 Family Procedure Rules and Practice Direction 3A  – Pre-Application Protocol for Mediation Information and Assessment 3A. This he set in the perspective of the Law Society’s response to Norgrove. As a group we explored the will of the courts to apply r.3 actively, and concluded that the district bench still has some distance to go.

This raised the question of compulsory mediation – not simply in private family law matters, but in financial remedy proceedings.  ‘Expecting’ and ‘requiring’ attendance at MIAMs are two different concepts arising from differing cultures. Attenders appeared to favour an element of compulsion in relation to the mediation process.

Finally, Ross Lee addressed the rise and use of Arbitration in family proceedings – opening the door to the private and confidential resolution of family conflicts. Is this the beginning of ‘private courts’ for family conflicts? Ross drew our attention to AI v MT (2013) EWHC 100 (Fam) where between paragraphs 26-37 Mr Justice Baker considered the use of arbitration in relation to proceedings involving children.

 

Karen Lennon updated attenders on CW v SG (2013 EWHC 854 (Fam), W (Children) (2013) EWCA Civ 335, AB v BB (2013) EWHC 227 (Fam) and Re H-L (A Child) (2013) EWCA Civ 655.

CW v SG and W (Children) concerned applications relating to Parental Responsibility, and when – and in what circumstances – this could or should be terminated. Karen Lennon drew our attention to the conflict of approach between the cases and the difficulty practitioners may encounter in this area.

AB v BB concerned the risks to children of a direct contact order with their father. In this case, mother gave evidence by video link and the court balanced the father’s Article 8 rights with the risks arising from contact. The case has significance arising from Mrs Justice Theis’ test at paragraph 13.

Re H-L (A Child) concerned the appointment of experts and R.25(1), a case featuring Janet Bazley QC and Carly Henley – both members of the Dere Street Barristers Family Team who were commended by the court for “the helpful way in which they have assisted the court in teasing out both the detail of this case and the wider implications of the new rule”.

Importantly, Lord Justice McFarlane prefaced his judgment with these words,

“In preparing the judgments which are now being handed down I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of Sir James Munby P in which he sets out general guidance upon the interpretation of Family Procedure Rules 2010, rule 25.1 which restricts expert evidence “to that which in the opinion of the court is necessary to assist the court to resolve the proceedings”. I would wish to associate myself, word for word, with the guidance contained within the President’s judgment in this case. The judgment which I now give seeks to apply the approach described in the President’s judgment to the facts of the present case.

The court made reference to Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535[2008] 2 FLR 625, paras [120], [125]. R25(1) it was said “has a meaning lying somewhere between ‘indispensable’ on the one hand and ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘desirable’ on the other hand”, having “the connotation of the imperative, what is demanded rather than what is merely optional or reasonable or desirable.” In my judgment, that is the meaning, the connotation, the word ‘necessary’ has in rule 25.1.

So, now we know exactly what the court expects!

Of importance, Karen Lennon asked us to consider the case in relation to private law proceedings where experts may be required and where the same test would be applied.

This, the second of nine lectures in the current series, was a superb resource, saving those attending a considerable amount of work in sourcing these important cases and materials. Discussions continued after the lecture, until the final pod of the Yorkshire Wheel came to rest – a fitting end to two fascinating lectures.

The Headmaster’s slipper

headmaster2

A post dealing with filing court orders  – the unpaid work of barristers

In a previous posting Family Proceedings on the Move we caught sight of Judge Stephen Alderson’s pincer move concerning the drafting of court orders by advocates.

With the imminence of the Single Family Court, and the critical time limits by which it will be judged, a further new direction has been given concerning the filing of orders. I have set it out in full below, with some highlighting.

When many years ago, this blogger came to practice at the Bar, the judges drew their own orders – for that was a part of their job  – for which they were paid.

Now, it seems, it is a task for the advocates – for which in publicly funded cases, they are not paid. No doubt the President would deem it to be part of the not-inconsiderable ‘pro bono’ work of the 21st Century Bar.

What is even more questionable is the way in which the burden shifts deftly from the Applicant  ‘litigant in person’  – to the privately paying Respondent.

So, not only does a represented party bear a responsibility to prepare the case summary, court documentation and bundles, but now to spend further time after the case has been completed in drafting the orders. Those who responsibly seek representation, end up paying the whole cost of case management.

Of course, counsel and solicitors can and do prepare perfectly agreeable orders when needed, but there are cases where a draft order limps back and forth before a reluctant agreement is reached. That is because the advocates have to unravel from the judgment what the judge really intended – and sometimes this can be a mind-boggling affair.

When we listen to a judgment, we take from it a differing emphasis or ‘spin’ , and this may find its way into the order that we draft. Other times, the judge may fail to cover a point that could have been picked up by the judge had she or he drawn up the order. In such cases it is left to the battle lines of counsel and solicitors who may have very different views from the judge.

But for now, it is to be our job. Do it to pleasure the judges. Fail – and it appears that you will be punished on costs. And you don’t want that!

Submission of draft orders for approval in the Single Family Court

This direction applies to the High Court and all of the County Courts sitting in the area of the jurisdiction of the Northumbria Cluster and North Durham Courts.

It has become apparent that on a number of occasions Counsel, advocate Solicitors and/or instructing Solicitors have been responsible for delay in submitting draft orders for approval by the Judge when required to do so and this has caused disruption to the management of cases in a proper time frame. A considerable amount of Court time is being spent pursuing Orders causing delay in producing sealed Orders for the parties.

While it is accepted that in a few individual cases that the Judge and the Advocates may make separate arrangements, at the Advocates request, this direction sets out the expectations of the Judges to apply automatically in all Family cases.

  1. In all cases the responsibility to draft orders and submit them to the Court lies initially with the Advocate/instructing Solicitor for the Applicant however if the Applicant is not represented, then the responsibility falls to the Advocate/instructing Solicitor for the First and then the subsequent Respondents in order unless all of the parties are unrepresented.
  2. In all hearings before a High Court Judge, a Circuit Judge, Recorder or District Judge the Advocate/instructing Solicitor shall submit a draft order for approval within 48 hours.
  3. In the case of final hearings of applications for a Financial Remedy under Part 9 of the FPR 2010 the Advocate/instructing Solicitor shall draft and submit the Order for approval by 4:00 pm on the seventh working day after the close of the hearing.
  4. All draft orders following a hearing shall be submitted by e-mail in Word format (not PDF) to the relevant Court as listed below or by agreement to the individual Judge directly.
  5. If an Advocate/instructing Solicitor has not submitted a draft order as above or as individually agreed then the matter will be referred to the Judge and if necessary listed for a mention before the Judge for an explanation of the delay and the costs of that hearing will be at large.

Whilst an advert may appear at the foot, this blog is neither monetarised, nor endorsing any product

Privatised courts – where to, where from?

sold

The Times, May 28 scooped the story. If not subscribed to The Times Online, the reader should turn to Ben Bryant of the Telegraph to pick up the storyline, and Owen Bowcott of the Guardian who digs deeper into the Ministry of Justice denials.

The story turns on a possible saving to the Ministry of Justice of £1 billion per year, brought about by the ‘wholesale privatisation’ of the courts, thus freeing them from Treasury control. Private investment and means-tested payments would relieve the taxpayer of the long standing burden.

Sarah Vine of the Guardian also enters the fray, fingering the velum of the fourteenth century Magna Carta, and concluding, “If Grayling has his way, the only heads left above the corporate water will be the judges”.

Whilst the media focus is understandably on the prospect of corporation – such as G4S running the court service and in time perhaps even employing the judges – this blogger is more interested in the imminence of something more subtle.

Historically, the state has run a monopoly on the provision of justice including the appointment of judges whose offices followed revenue, and would be granted to those who supported the monarch.  C J Sansome’s sixteenth century barrister Matthew Shardlake in the novel ‘Heartstone‘, gives a graphic description of the judges of the ‘Court of Wards and Augmentations’, the courts that dealt with wardship (equivalent to our modern day Family Courts).  After the Dissolution of the Monasteries and the seizure and selling of monastic lands, the ancient ‘Office of Wards’ was abolished and replaced by the Wardship court which checked the value of lands subject to wardship, and the feodaries negotiated with applicants for the wardship (and the land) of minor heirs. Some were granted to the children’s families, but those more valuable would be awarded to the highest bidders.  Bringing revenue to the King, “Wards and Augmentations would sit all summer, observed Shardlake. Justice has always been the younger brother of money, whether in the hands of the client, the lawyer or the state.

Yet this blogger senses that the issue that most concerns government is not the running of courts, but the sheer scale and cost of public justice.

Hiving off the court buildings and administration to the private sector could undoubtedly result in savings – you only have to look at prisons to see this. It could also provide a better service deal for court users. How often as clients or advocates have we wasted hours, or even days, in waiting ‘our turn’ in the overstretched court list before a judge who is expected to react to information dished up on the morning of trial? The private sector could not get it more wrong.

The real point of reform is that it is the public that ends up underwriting the cost of other people’s disputes, no matter how unreasonable. The ‘issue fee’ no way reflects the cost of running the court and the salary of judges. For genuine civic disputes, this is a necessary social cost. But for private disputes, arguments concerning spousal assets, and company and commercial disputes, the subsidy by the public is unacceptable.

Recently retired Lord Justice Sir Alan Ward summed up the problem in a noisy floor dispute, “Not all neighbours are from hell. They may simply occupy the land of bigotry. There may be no escape from hell but the boundaries of bigotry can with tact be changed by the cutting edge of reasonableness skilfully applied by a trained mediator. Give and take is often better than all or nothing”.

As other alternatives are available, why should the taxpayer fund big-money divorce litigation,  the bankers’ dispute, or the noisy floor? The litigation costs of these cases are enormous, but the parties are really just paying their lawyers bills, rather than the judges’ salaries and the public cost of running a court.

The government’s agenda is to shed as much work from the state court system as possible. These days, courts clearly do not pay.

There is, of course, the minor problem of Article 6 European Convention of Human Rights, providing “in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. Perhaps this too is an underlying reason why some politicians are keen for repeal.

So, the blogger will forecast the next steps.

Commercial, company and most civil disputes will be directed towards arbitration, mediation and expert determination at first instance. These processes will be the ‘gate keepers’ for entry to the courts. The ‘reasonable time’ for determination of a dispute will run from the point where the alternative resolution mechanisms have been exhausted.

Likewise, family disputes involving children and money will be referred to alternative dispute resolution – where most will be expected to be solved. Only then, and on sanction of costs, will the courts intervene. The Family Court experiment with public law cases will flounder in delays exceeding 26 weeks and be replaced by tribunals.

Criminal cases will be handled by increasing use of community resolution processes, such as self-referral, the acceptance of voluntary penalties and restorative justice, offenders knowing that these will deliver the best deals. Only the hardened criminal for whom prison is inevitable will the door to the dock opened.

Of course we will still pay for the judges, but a slimmed down bench, with reduced pensions, and the small accompanying coterie of cut price lawyers will be cheap in comparison.

Perhaps Justice Secretary Chris Grayling has a point…..?

Cost of barrister regulation soars

By Neil Rose of Legal Futures

A post dealing with the cost of regulating barristers

The Bar Standards Board (BSB) is already projecting a £161,000 overspend on its 2013-14 budget, which itself is £1.2m (or 30%) higher than the previous 12 months, Legal Futures can report.

The BSB’s financial year only began on 1 April but the recent meeting of its main board heard that a lack of budgeted resource for education projects – and in particular the Bar course aptitude test – is responsible for around 60% of the forecast overspend.

The BSB and Bar Council agreed the higher budget for this financial year after regulation ate up £460,000 of the Bar Council’s reserves in 2012-13.

The £1.2m increase is mainly because of “the pressure of implementing the regulatory standards framework”, according to the BSB’s business plan, which was published last month.

The framework is laid down by the Legal Services Board (LSB) and has four key pillars: outcomes-focused regulation, risk assessment, supervision and enforcement. Each regulator has to show sufficient capacity and capability to regulate in those key areas. The LSB’s assessment of how the BSB is currently performing against these is due to be published shortly.

The increase will be offset in part by an expected rise in non-practising certificate fee income of £432,000 to £1.8m. It appears that the Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates accounts for this. The BSB is expecting income of £452,000 for initial accreditation applications, and a further £35,000 from barristers progressing up the levels.

The two main heads of the BSB’s expenditure are governance/management (£1.6m) and disciplinary/enforcement activities (£1.4m).

When premises costs of £678,000 and shared services of £2.1m are taken into account, the total cost of regulation for barristers is £8.2m. The LSB is to launch a major investigation into the cost of regulation across the legal profession.

Meanwhile, Alistair MacDonald QC has been named the vice-chairman-elect of the Bar Council following a contested election. He will take up the post on 1 January 2014 with a view to becoming chairman a year later.

Mr MacDonald is co-head of New Park Chambers in Leeds, which has just lost a bid to take on an ex-chief constable as a pupil without paying her. His practice is now principally in crime although he used to do a broad spread of work including personal injury and administrative law. He is the leader of the North-Eastern Circuit and has sat as a Recorder in crime and civil since 1995.

Nicholas Lavender QC, who practises commercial law from Serle Court Chambers, will be the 2014 chairman.

Also, the Bar Council has finally appointed a new chief executive, two years after David Hobart left to take up the same role at the City of London Law Society.

Stephen Crowne, who will take up the post next Monday, was most recently as senior director, global education at IT company Cisco. Formerly a senior civil servant, before Cisco he was chief executive of the British Educational Technology & Communications Agency, the government agency charged with promoting technology in learning.

The appointment panel included representatives from the Bar Council and Bar Standards Board.

Why I have a problem with the Family Law Bar Association

Man Hanging on a Scale While Another Man Fills Dish

A post dealing with the thorny issue of public funding our private disputes

The ‘May fees update’ from the Family Law Bar Association has now hit our email boxes.

The FLBA warns us in no uncertain terms to take heed of the proposed changes for public funding in criminal cases set out in the government paper ‘Transforming Legal Aid: delivering a more credible and efficient system‘ , and to see this as a “far reaching” proposal that may go on to deny ‘the most vulnerable members of our society access to specialist legal advice’.

Clive Baker, in his detailed response to the government paper links back to the effect of the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO). There  he cites a cut of £350m per year affecting 600,000 people. He suggests that  LASPOA was the start of ‘work in progress’ to trim the legal aid budget for family work rather than the end of the matter.

So, has the FLBA got it right. Is Armageddon just round the corner for both the legal profession and the public they serve?

Chris Grayling, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice subscribes to a simple view concerning the funding of criminal cases,

“Over the past decade, the system has lost much of its credibility with the public. Taxpayers’ money has been used to pay for frivolous claims, to foot the legal bills of wealthy criminals, and to cover cases which run on and on racking up large fees for a small number of lawyers, far in excess of what senior public servants are paid. Under the previous government, the cost of the system spiralled out of control, and it became one of the most costly in the world”.

The blogger has memories that exceed the ‘past decade’ and is tempted to say that since public funding has been available ‘it has always been thus’. Indeed, the blogger’s favourite legal friend Matthew Shardlake interfaced with the same frivolous claims, wealthy criminals and exploitative lawyers in the 16th century. It could be said that ‘where there are lawyers, there will always be conflict’.

The doomsday practitioners gather sustenance from Lord Justice Ward in Wright v Michael Wright Supplies Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 23416, who at para 2 addresses one of the consequences of withdrawing public funded legal advice:

“What I find so depressing is that the case highlights the difficulties increasingly encountered by the judiciary at all levels when dealing with litigants in person. …. how to bring order to the chaos which litigants in person invariably – and wholly understandably – manage to create in putting forward their claims and defences. Judges should not have to micro-manage cases, coaxing and cajoling the parties to focus on the issues that need to be resolved”. ” It may be saving the Legal Services Commission which no longer offers legal aid for this kind of litigation but saving expenditure in one public department in this instance simply increases it in the courts. The expense of three judges of the Court of Appeal dealing with this kind of appeal is enormous. …. The appeal would certainly never have occurred if the litigants had been represented. With more and more self-represented litigants, this problem is not going to go away. We may have to accept that we live in austere times, but as I come to the end of eighteen years service in this court, I shall not refrain from expressing my conviction that justice will be ill served indeed by this emasculation of legal aid.”

But an essential question is not whether the court is able to cope with litigants in person, but whether the system should direct them there as the most appropriate venue to resolve their dispute?

Blog readers by now will know of my views on the importance of mediation and private arbitration. You will also have read of my views about the relevance of an adversarial process in family disputes, and questioning the need for parents in conflict to have ‘party status‘.

Has Lord Justice Ward missed the point as he reaches his 18th year aboard the Court of Appeal? Is it necessary, or even advisable to have lawyers directing proceedings from the beginning of a dispute to its end? And should the public carry the bill?

Should he not reflect back on Lord Woolf’s comments in Cowl v Plymouth (2001) EWCA 1935 at para 25:

Without the need for the vast costs which must have been incurred in this case already being incurred, the parties should have been able to come to a sensible conclusion as to how to dispose the issues which divided them. If they could not do this without help, then an independent mediator should have been recruited to assist. That would have been a far cheaper course to adopt. Today sufficient should be known about ADR to make the failure to adopt it, in particular when public money is involved, indefensible”.

There is something singularly unattractive about a profession as well paid as ours, raising principled arguments concerning the withdrawal of our publicly funded income.

Whilst the points are well made, surely the art now is to raise them subtly, record them, and work positively and creatively with a popular, democratic idea. Should it fail, of course we will be there to pick up the pieces.

Closed doors in public courts

pack of cards

In my last posting ‘£25 m mediation budget following the death of legal aid‘, I mentioned the case of W v M (2012)EWHC 1679 (Fam), with the forward thinking judgment from Mostyn J.

It was only after writing, that it occurred to the blogger that Sir Nicholas Mostyn‘s judgment could hold the key for a dramatic development for future legal services in England and Wales.

When an established and credible ‘private process of dispute resolution’ is available through mediation and private arbitration, why should our system of public justice ever work behind closed doors?

Perhaps now is the time for the former Presidents of the Family Division Mr Justice Potter’s 2008/9 vision and Sir Nicholas Wall’s endorsement, to become a reality? Maybe now parliament should be preparing to update the House of Commons Standard Library note?

Nicholas  Mostyn is not a stranger to this line of thinking. In M vM & London Borough of Sutton he lifted the injunction on the Sunday Telegraph columnist from reporting proceedings.

The current President, Lord Justice Munby is on record with even more radical views,

“Both principle and pragmatism demand that we open the family courts, that we drastically relax the present access restrictions.

“But affording access to the family courts is not alone enough. The answer, if I may be permitted to adopt the former Lord Chancellor’s language, is that we need both more people going into the family courts and more information coming out. Each of these is essential; neither alone is sufficient.”

“I am not talking merely about judgments which are thought to be reportable because of their perceived legal interest. Releasing for publication only those judgments which are ‘reportable’ means that the public obtains a seriously skewed impression of the system. What one might call ‘routine’ judgments in ‘ordinary’ care cases and private law cases should surely also be published – all of them, unless, in the particular case, there is good reason not to. The second point leads on from the first. It is not only High Court judgments that should be published in this way. Why should not County Court judgments also be published?”

More recently, on 22 February 2013 at the Family Law Bar Association dinner he said,

” I am determined to take steps to improve access to and reporting of family proceedings. I am determined that the new Family Court should not be saddled, as the family courts are at present, with the charge that we are a system of secret and unaccountable justice. Work, commenced by my predecessor, is well underway. I hope to be in a position to make important announcements in the near future”.

And today, we have new practice guidance in relation to public access to committals for contempt of court.

In W v M Sir Nicholas Mostyn said,

“Where parties are agreed that their case should be afforded total privacy there is a very simple solution: they sign an arbitration agreement. Arbitration has long been available in proceedings such as these. Recently arbitration has also become available in financial remedy proceedings by virtue of the much-to-be-welcomed scheme promoted by the Institute of Family Law Arbitrators. In those proceedings also privacy can now be guaranteed”.

Does Sir Nicholas’ obiter sound the rallying call for imminent change?

‘For private proceedings, choose a private process. If you come to public courts, increasingly expect justice that is open to public scrutiny’.

£25M mediation budget following the death of legal aid

lord mcnally

Lord McNally, Family Justice Minister

April 1 2013 saw the inception of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, one of the most far reaching legal provisions in a generation.

Some commentators see the change in the legal aid rules as a disaster.

Since April, your blogger, wearing his hat as barrister and advocate, attends court to face increasing numbers of litigants in person – and cases out of control. For the judges it is more stressful. They have the immensely difficult job of case management with parties that fail to understand the rules and question the reasons for them.

And of course, there are those who cannot contemplate representing themselves and simply feel shut out of their legal remedies. The courts were not ready for this. There is some help from the Bar Council’s guide, and more from Lucy Reed‘s Family Courts Without a Lawyer publication. But almost certainly, this will not be enough to avoid degrees of chaos.

The Ministry of Justice has however allocated £25 million (an increase of £15m) to support family mediation. Lord McNally, Family Justice Minister expects mediation assessment meetings to provide the answer – providing important information about facilitation and allowing parties access to mediation services. McNally contends that, with mediation, the average time to resolve property and financial remedy disputes drops from 435 days to 110 days, together with the accompanying reduction of cost and stress to the parties.

Leading up to, and since 1 April, new mediation services (such as the pilot at Teesside Combined Court Centre) and the blogger’s service ‘Divorce Without Pain‘ have sprung up to deal with the increase in need for mediation. It is too early to tell whether these schemes will flourish, and indeed whether parties to a dispute will favour specialist lawyer mediators.

Arbitration has likewise come to the fore as a method of dealing with property and financial remedy disputes. For several years these methods have been tested in Ontario, Canada and Australia – and introduced two years ago in Scotland through its Family Law Arbitration Group Scotland. Vancouver arbitrator Georgialee Lang, speaks of the “disharmony, conflict, lengthy delays and outrageous legal fees.” arising from the current court systems for family law – and describes courts as “the worst place for couples to resolve their divorce issues”.

The English Family Law Arbitration Scheme set up by the Institute of Family Law Arbitrators is now celebrating its first anniversary, and reports steady progress, with numbers of trained arbitrators reaching double figures. It is still unclear how the courts will enforce the arbitration awards, although the Arbitration Act 1996 is susceptible for the purpose.

The courts too appear to favour the advent of arbitration in such disputes. Although W v M (2012) EWHC 1679 (Fam) relates to a Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 dispute, Mostyn J at para 70 said “Where parties are agreed that their case should be afforded total privacy there is a very simple solution: they sign an arbitration agreement. Arbitration has long been available in proceedings such as these. Recently arbitration has also become available in financial remedy proceedings by virtue of the much-to-be-welcomed scheme promoted by the Institute of Family Law Arbitrators. In those proceedings also privacy can now be guaranteed”.

In T v T (2012) EWHC 3462 (Fam) Nicholas Francis QC concluded that where a married couple had entered into a premarital agreement with an arbitration clause, the English court would not restrain the husband from seeking to enforce arbitration in the USA.

Cases such as W v M and T v T set the trend. Now what is needed is the culture change. It will be when parties to a dispute think ‘mediation’ or ‘arbitration’ as the first call, that we will see the proper rise of private dispute resolution rather than reliance on the courts and the lawyers that fan the flames.

Whistleblowing, confidentiality and privilege in mediation

whistleblower

Following disclosures by David Bowles, former chair of the United Lincolnshire Hospital Trust, Jeremy Hunt, Health Secretary, has warned NHS bosses not to block ‘whistleblowing’; and the government is to investigate the effect and import on such disclosures of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA).  

Is the Public Interest Disclosure Act too restrictive? Where there is a public interest need to protect those who disclose information that otherwise should be confidential, should it go further? To what extent is the public interest served by ‘gagging clauses’?

Some would see this as simply an employment law problem. Yet, daily, mediators in many disputes apply confidentiality clauses without necessarily addressing the ethical issues.

Background to confidentiality

Mediation was always ‘a voluntary, without prejudice process, conducted confidentially and managed by an independent, impartial neutral person’.

The Civil Procedure Rules 1998[1] encouraged the use of alternative dispute resolution in civil litigation, especially the use of mediation. In the early days Cowl & Ors v Plymouth City Council[2] and Dunnett v Railtrack PLC[3], the Court of Appeal highlighted the importance of mediation as a ‘without prejudice’ method for people in dispute to settle their differences without outside intervention. It encouraged parties in dispute to use a process that was understood to be a confidential and without prejudice method of resolving conflict.

Mediation privilege developing?

Changes to the model, to mediation practice, and to the definition of mediation have occurred over recent years, especially with the increased use of conciliation, in which mediation is conducted by an appointed person against the back-drop of statutory regulation[4]. There, confidentiality is partially excluded on the basis that this mediation process is underpinned by a positive public law duty to address and defeat discrimination, and that the conduct of the process should be open to scrutiny.

However, the cardinal principle of confidentiality still dominates private law disputes. Sir Henry Brooke[5] said “the confidentiality axiom underlying mediation proceedings constitutes the single most important reason for parties to resort to mediation in the first place”.  Only through a heightened awareness of the issue will we be prevented from “sleep walking into disaster” on this topic. Confidentiality in the mediation process is important and (regulation) should therefore provide for a minimum degree of compatibility of civil procedural rules with regard to how to protect the confidentiality of mediation in any subsequent civil and commercial judicial proceedings or arbitration”.

In Venture Investment Placement Ltd v Hall[6], the court held that “Mediation proceedings do have to be guarded with great care. The whole point of mediation proceedings is that the parties can be frank and open with each other, and that what is revealed in the course of the mediation proceedings is not to be used for or against either party in litigation, if the mediation proceedings fail”.

In Cumbria Waste Management Ltd., Lakeland Waste Management Ltd v Baines Wilson (A Firm)[7] Francs Kirkham J said “In my judgment, whether on the basis of the without prejudice rule or as an exception to the general rule that confidentiality is not a bar to disclosure, the court should support the mediation process by refusing, in normal circumstances, to order disclosure of documents and communications within a mediation”. Later he repeated “ In my judgment, the court should be very slow to order (such) disclosure. Mediators should be able to conduct mediations confident that, in normal circumstances, their papers could not be seen by the parties and others”.

So confidentiality remains a key historic concept in the definition of mediation: the mediation process is conducted without prejudice to any legal proceedings that may follow if unsuccessful; the parties can take a ‘generous’ stance and compromise during the mediation process; one party cannot use what is said in the process against the other in the absence of agreement; parties can divulge issues to an independent neutral mediator without that information being shared with anyone else, whether present or not[8].

Agreed in May 2008 and implemented in May 2011 between the majority of member states, the EU Mediation Directive[9] was designed to regulate cross-border mediation. The directive was part of a developing process in civil and commercial disputes to move dispute resolution away from international and national litigation into local resolution methods.

The directive reflects the increasing requirement and dependence of those in the dispute resolution industry on the use of mediation. In fact national governments across the world are actively looking at introducing mediation as the ‘gate-keeper’ to courts and formal legal process. In some countries this is already the case. Before instigating any claim or remedy, parties must go through the mediation process.

Impact of the European Directive

Directive preamble (23) reads:

“Confidentiality in the mediation process is important and this Directive should therefore provide for a minimum degree of compatibility of civil procedural rules with regard to how to protect the confidentiality of mediation in any subsequent civil and commercial judicial proceedings or arbitration”.

Article 7 of the directive emphasises the importance of the confidentiality principle and the need to ensure its protection. Whilst the directive relates specifically to cross-border disputes, there is a body of opinion that would encourage national governments to adopt the directive into domestic law, creating a unified approach to mediation, whether domestic or international[10]. Will similar or identical provisions develop elsewhere in the mediation field, and if so, how will they be applied to the English mediation process?

Do we have a position?

The debate on the issue of confidentiality in relation to mediation has been re-ignited by the issue of whistleblowing disclosures. How important is confidentiality in reality?

What is the impact of ‘sharing of information’ provisions which are increasingly being required in mediation service level agreements? Should we not be addressing this (and other issues in the wider debate) before we find that such confidentiality rules are made for us by default?

Should confidentiality remain a keystone to the mediation process? If confidentiality of the process were to be removed, what will be the short and long term effects on its viability and take-up? Would there be benefits from opening the mediation process to outside scrutiny?

There is concern about the development of mediation clauses within service level contracts for mediation – requiring the disclosure of the mediation process, behaviour by parties within the mediation process, and disclosure of detail of outcomes to third parties who have not been present and party to the mediation. This mirrors the concern relating to organisations that conduct mediations when their position is not, or may not be independent of the outcomes.

Whilst this development differs from the principle of disclosure in court or arbitral proceedings, it affects the underlying principle that the mediation process should free parties to attempt to sort out their dispute privately without any come-back should their attempts fail, and without the public, or public authorities scrutinising what concessions have been made.

Earlier this year, CEDR’s working party[11] reported:

“We are convinced that confidentiality remains a cornerstone of mediation practice and needs to be observed, protected and delivered carefully so as to help parties open up to each other and to the mediator and indeed to enhance the possibility of settlement without in either case harming their case if settlement does not emerge and adjudication is later required by judge or arbitrator. The security which confidentiality generates is used to encourage greater openness and more disclosure by parties at the right stage and when they are ready”.

Clearly, there are public interest issues to be considered – not least the danger that organisations such as the NHS may use the confidentiality clause in mediation settlements to gag whistleblowers.  But how far should this go? Is it possible, in succumbing to a ‘social need or desire to know’ that the underlying integrity of mediation as a voluntary, without prejudice, confidential and impartial process may be undermined so as to remove the real advantages that mediation has historically offered?  Or, as Jeremy Hunt would have it, should the confidentiality clauses in mediation be lifted on the basis that they may at times work against the interest of the wider public to know what has gone on?

Article 7

Confidentiality of mediation

1. Given that mediation is intended to take place in a manner which respects confidentiality, Member States shall ensure that, unless the parties agree otherwise, neither mediators nor those involved in the administration of the mediation process shall be compelled to give evidence in civil and commercial judicial proceedings or arbitration regarding information arising out of or in connection with a mediation process, except:

(a) where this is necessary for overriding considerations of public policy of the Member State concerned, in particular when required to ensure the protection of the best interests of children or to prevent harm to the physical or psychological integrity of a person; or

(b) where disclosure of the content of the agreement resulting from mediation is necessary in order to implement or enforce that agreement.

2. Nothing in paragraph 1 shall preclude Member States from enacting stricter measures to protect the confidentiality of mediation.


[1] CPR 1.4(2)(e) and CPR 3.1(2)(m)

[2] 14 December 2001: Court of Appeal

[3] 22 February 2002: Court of Appeal Costs Judgment

[4] for example in relation to age, disability and discrimination cases

[5]15 July 2008:  former Lord Justice of Appeal and Vice-President of the Court of Appeal Civil Division: per “The Mediation Directive: What Will it Mean for Us?”: Gordon Blake (2008)74 Arbitration 4 @ p441

[6] (2005) EWHC 625

[7] (2008) EWHC 786

[8] save in exceptional circumstances where a failure to disclose may result in serious harm (PIDA)

[9]Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008

[10] see David Cornes “Mediation Privilege and the EU Mediation Directive: An Opportunity?” : (2008) 74 Arbitration 4 p.395

[11] CEDR Confidentiality, a Guide for Mediators 31 January 2013   http://www.cedr.com/articles/?317

Direct Access Revisited: a simple guide

public access

If you were to glance back to the 20 May 2012, you would see my first blog concerning Direct Access. Some of my readers have asked me to share more insight into how Direct Access is working in practice – its potential -what to look out for – and how to develop a Direct Access practice.

The first step, of course, is to undertake the Public Access training and to ensure that you are recorded as Direct Access authorised on the Bar Council’s Public Access Directory. Remember that the rules in relation to Direct Access change frequently, so it is necessary to keep up to date with the public access guidance for barristers.

Some sets of chambers are especially well organised when it comes to public access. They have part of their web site dedicated to direct access. Most enquiries from the public arise from either a search of the Bar Council Directory, or from a simple web search. Without a clear and inviting profile on your chambers web page, potential clients face difficulty in finding you. You should also join the Public Access Bar Association, both for accessing information and making direct access contacts. Note that a number of barristers have set up their own individual, bespoke web pages to promote their practices (e.g. here). Both for sole practitioners and members of established sets, this offers a higher level of personal visibility for barristers who wish to undertake this work.

Next, it is important to determine precisely what market you are seeking to target. Whilst solicitors are familiar with the most direct route to the barrister of their choice, members of the public clearly do not have that expertise. Your marketing profile will determine how many hits you get and thus the number of enquiries for services. In my experience, members of the public seek you out either because they have heard of you, or because you appear to specialise not just in a particular field, but also share a special stand-point on it.

Administering a public access practice requires a different approach for chambers’ clerks. Here they may benefit from one of the Bar Council courses. The contract is key, and the management of fees requires careful thought to avoid handling clients’ funds. Here are some of the helpful guidelines and model client care documents.

The benefits from public access for clients are clear -they get to their specialist advisor and advocate from the outset. Their barrister will guide their case, advising on procedure, evidence, and the conduct of the case. The client can undertake the administrative tasks under guidance, avoiding excessive legal bills at hourly rates.

For the barrister, public access can be one of the most rewarding areas of practice – not necessarily in financial terms- but in the close working relationship with the client that is possible when you are guiding their case. Most importantly, you end up with the case that you would have wanted to run, rather than a pile of papers with critical omissions emailed the night before the hearing.

Refusal to mediate

Recorder Stephen Furst QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge has demonstrated just how in touch and functional the modern judiciary can be.

His decision was PGFII SA v OMFS Company (2012) EWHC 83. Yes, this is a Technology and Construction Court case, but don’t go away – those with mixed practices, or specialist practices elsewhere should take careful note.  The TCC has led the way in mediation matters for the rest of the specialist Bars.

A trial of issues between the two companies, PGF and OMFS was due to start on 11 January 2012. The day before trial, PGF accepted a long-standing Part 36 offer made by OMFS in April 2011. This compromised the substantive claim. But what about costs?

In the ordinary course of events, PGF would not have stood a ghost’s chance of resisting OMFS’ costs from the date of offer to the eve of the trial. PGF’s acceptance of the Part 36 offer was extremely late and out of time. PGF should have been in dire straights with the judge.

However, PGF had made two offers of mediation, the first round about the time OMFS made their Part 36 offer, and the second in July 2011. OMFS had ignored both.

Were OMFS justified in dismissing the offer of mediation?

It is right to observe that the parties had attempted to mediate another issue unsuccessfully in 2010. OMFS sought to blame PGF for its failure. Would this rescue OMFS, and how would the judge deal with this suggestion?

Well, as you expected, the answers to the questions were ‘no’ and ‘no’. Recorder Furst showed what Tony Allen, Solicitor, Mediator and Senior Consultant to CEDR described as “an excellent understanding of the dynamics of mediation”.

Recorder Furst started by applying Halsey v Milton Keynes NHST perfectly. Had PGF shown that mediation had a reasonable prospect of success? Yes, their offer was genuine and was repeated. Had OMFS behaved reasonably? No, they had simply ignored the invitations, shutting themselves out from arguing the ‘prospect of success’ point. Did the previous unsuccessful attempt at mediation make a difference? No, “the court should be wary of arguments only raised in retrospect as to why a party refused to mediate or as to why it cannot be demonstrated that a mediation would have had a reasonable prospect of success”. Would the court look into the reasons why a previous mediation had not been successful? No, “courts wish to encourage mediation”, and to dive into that pool (my words) would be to be to undermine the confidentiality of the earlier mediation.

Other key phrases fell from the lips of the learned Recorder. In answer to the question of reasonable refusal he said,  “the skill of a mediator lies in drawing out seemingly intractable positions” – “the essence of all successful mediations is a willingness to compromise and/or the realisation that certain points are not as strong as the party believed”.

Even though they had accepted OMFS’ early offer, PGF were awarded costs up to the expiry date of OMFS’ offer, and resisted being punished in costs thereafter, with a no-costs order.

Lessons learned? First, don’t ignore a request to mediate, no matter what you may think of it. If you are determined to take this risk, at least set out cogent arguments at the time for your refusal, and keep your fingers crossed that a judge will agree with you later – but don’t count on it! Second, wouldn’t you be better off to take the risk and try the mediation? If costs escalate and your refusal is held to be unreasonable, you may end up with a legal costs bill that eclipses your claim. Third, look out for the filter-down effect of this judgment into other civil and family courts. Where the TCC goes today, other courts will follow.

Whilst an advert may appear at the foot, this blog is neither monetarised, nor endorsing any product

End of an Era

Only because it is the height of summer in England, the thin light of morning strains to penetrate my bedroom blinds. In any other season, it would be dark as a cave and twice as cold. The alarm sounds and shakes. Is that ‘BBC Radio 4’, or still the ‘World Service’ that whispers from my bedside radio? Why, after a lifetime and a half of being a barrister does the prospect of waking and rising at dawn dismay me so?

Today is Bridlington. The zenith of a thirty three year career at the Bar draws me back to the East Coast’s most lost seaside Family Proceedings Court, lying at the end of a road that will go no further. The listing is for 10.00 am, but the case requires an earlier attendance. This will follow a protracted journey out across the River Tees into North Yorkshire, casting off the A1 at Thirsk, mounting the Hambleton Hills at Sutton Bank and winding slowly across the moors and wolds into East Yorkshire – towards the smell of the sea. The journey there will take two and a half hours – the same time as a fast train to London. The listing is for twenty minutes.

That the case is dull is not an issue. That the net remuneration rate from the Legal Services Commission will not exceed £9.00 per hour is just one of those things in legal life. But that after a lifetime at the Bar this is my fate, is altogether something else. Fortunately, my little Smart 42 will deliver 80 mpg of diesel, so I have one economy to console me. Perhaps a solitary portion of fish and chips on the pier will be another.

Of course you will already have gathered where my florid self-indulgence is to lead. Today represents my last day of public duty – of devotion to the Commission’s service. With the rattle of the court’s security gates behind me, I shall no more return to the Family Proceedings Court here in Bridlington, or indeed elswhere.

I share my decision, and my fate. My advocates’ room announcement leads to sweet sadness on the part of colleagues who appear to lament both the passing of my era, and the loss of age and experience to a tier of justice that so often needs a mature voice.

Party Status in Family Proceedings: radical changes

Photo courtesy BBC

In an earlier posting – Parents in Care Proceedings -Parties or Witnesses, I raised the question of whether parents should have party status in cases involving their children.  I also explored the success of  Mediation Information and Assessment Meetings as a mechanism to moderate adult protagonists in private law family proceedings.

A number of readers have expressed a particular interest in these ramblings, and I feel the time is right to pull the ideas together into a tighter structure, so to progress the debate.

The premise was that, whether public or private law proceedings, frequently the competing and increasingly vociferous claims of  parents, grandparents and other family members don’t promote – but often get in the way of justice for the child. Proceedings, where the flames are fanned by lawyers, fuelled by a jerry can of public funding, develop a life of their own – with the voice of the child getting lost in the melee.

I considered whether the voice of the adults should have such prominance. Should family cases be instigated as they are now, like civil cases, with a claim that brings parents as ‘applicants’ and ‘respondents’ in opposition? What is the real need for an adversarial process in family law? And what is the justification for using the public’s money to pay for such a potentially polemic process?

Important decisions are taken in relation to families. Some would say that they constitute the most important decisions next to the issue of depriving individuals of their liberty. This seems to be the main driver for retaining the adversarial process in family law. However, what we have ended up with is in fact a quasi-adversarial process, where roles are fudged, and the traditional adversarial approach is deprecated by the judges who have responsibility for it. Perhaps rightly, when you see first-hand what the conflict produces – attempts at manipulation, polarity, and a reluctance to compromise.

In a real child-centred system, you would not have a system where the competing claims and counter-claims of parents set the stage for a court hearing. You would substitute a process where the voice of the child was heard first and last, and the adult players gave their opinions as witnesses.

Of course such a process would require significant cultural and statutory changes. First, you would need a new mechanism in which, when an issue was raised that concerned a child, the child or children would be represented as a matter of course. The solicitor for the child would take charge of the case, contacting the parents or other witnesses with a view to taking statements from them. The child’s solicitor would share the various views and arrange a moderation meeting where appropriate. Whenever possible, out of court agreements would be forged. Where not possible, a judge would adjudicate on the basis of the evidence – oral and written – the parents attending simply as witnesses.

The children’s guardian and the guardian’s solicitor would have a paramount duty to the child, and to the court from whom they received their appointment. Clearly, there would be a need for oversight of their functions and role, but this could be provided by a professional body for guardians and, of course, the judge – who would have  final case-management responsibility.

The blogger believes that many parents would be greatly relieved by such a change. On the whole, parents do not love the adversarial court process, and those that do should not dictate a system for those that do not. Furthermore, most parents do not relish the considerable cost of representation in a battle concerning their children. What they do want is someone to help them formulate a realistic position that has a chance of favour with a judge, the right to answer any concerns about their ability to parent, and the opportunity to be heard before a decision is made.

Whether represented by lawyers, or litigants in person – parents, grandparents and other family members make bad case managers. Solicitors representing both public law and private law clients sometimes fare little better and miss or avoid opportunities to re-direct their clients’ energies away from conflict into the constructive compromise that courts seek.

The downside of these radical ideas is that thousands of family lawyers would face a lean time. The plug pulled on the stream of public funding, and their role restricted to assisting parents as witnesses, the lawyers would no longer feature as visible players in the process. However, the public costs saved could be diverted to fund the guardian’s role, ensuring that public money is put where it will have the best advantage – to enable the interests of children to take centre stage.

The Virtual Court

Photo: Kenya’s 1st virtual court session

Hertfordshire, along with Kent, Cheshire and London, have undertaken pilot studies of ‘ the virtual court‘. Designed for criminal cases, prisoners were video linked from prison for remand hearings.

Last week, the blogger video linked yet again from Leeds to the Royal Courts of Justice for a hearing in a family case.

The idea of the virtual court is not new. Nearly a decade and a half ago following the publication of a number of papers on the subject (including this one from Robin Widdison), the then Lord Chancellor Geoff Hoon mooted the idea of virtual court hearings. In 2001, Lord Justice Sir Henry Brooke had a go,  and in November 2011, Lord Neuberger came very close to the concept of the virtual court.

If you were to poll both professional court users and litigants, the blogger suspects that feedback would centre on the age-old issues: cost, delay, stress of attending court, waiting for the case to be called on, not getting on. They are the main reasons that the English legal system has been moving more and more towards alternative dispute resolution. Might ‘the virtual court’ also address or help with all or some of these issues?

Almost all interim hearings could so easily be removed from the court setting to a judge-supported administrative path. Yes, sometimes the parties need to see and hear from the judge in person – for example where settlement indications are sought (for example in financial dispute resolution meetings). But the sound of the voice and the whites of the eyes are equally audible and visible through video linking.

Just like working from the screen rather than the page, video hearings require new skills from both the lawyers and the judges, and to get them, a degree of new discipline. The blogger is unconvinced by lawyer’s assertions that “it takes the door of the court to broker a settlement”. All that is needed is a culture change. What better way to change the culture of settlement than for judges to prepare for a video hearing by reading the papers and setting an agenda, and the lawyers to prepare their clients properly before the video hearing?

The technology is there, and so is an increasing level of judicial experience of video hearings. The parties to a claim or case could simply attend their solicitor’s offices for a video conference with the judge. Any documentation to be shared could be scanned and emailed and in one simple measure the issues of overcrowded courts in staffed and expensive real estate, long delays and waiting time, court security, costly and lengthy travel arrangements and the unscheduled use of judge’s time, could be reduced.

Or is the legal profession too conservative, profit orientated, orally obsessed, or self-interested to make such developments work? Why has fifteen years of judicial driving towards the virtual court resulted in virtually nothing?

Job description of a barrister

Did I miss it? I have just undertaken a web search for a job description of a barrister, without much success. How interesting…

Targetjobs got my best score (nine out of ten points);  Allaboutcareers had a go : “yep, that’s right, barristers are likely to do a fair bit of advocacy work”:  (4 out of ten points); and the Bar Council condensed their attempt into five lines (a miserable 2 out of 10 points from me).

But to their credit, their purpose was one of general description, rather than role definition. Maybe they should be forgiven, and perhaps the blogger should have used more fastidious search criteria.

The problem with the job of barrister is that it really defies simple description. Possibly every barrister in private practice does a different job, and so merits a different job description. The assorted collection of types, personalities, practices and outlooks in chambers tells a similar story – where individuality can transform the type of work received, the way in which it is undertaken, and the level of income at the end of the tax year.

However, the blogger thought it might be fun to try to define the role. The interest of the exercise is not necessarily in the finished product, but more in the questions that arise in the journey. Take a look, and see how suited you are for the job!

Specification

 A barrister who:

  • complies with the 8th Edition of the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales;
  • has paid all fees and subscriptions to maintain practising status, and is listed as currently practising in the Barrister’s Register;
  • has passed chamber’s selection process and been admitted to chambers as a practising member;
  • complies with the responsibilities of a practising member as set out in the constitution of the individual set of chambers;
  • pays all dues required of a practising member under the constitution.

Job Description

Title:                            member of chambers (member)

Reporting to:            Head of Chambers

Hours:                         sufficient to undertake the demanding role of barrister

Function:                   to advise and act as advocate for professional and lay clients where instructed to do so.

Key Accountabilities

  1. To read instructions as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event within 7 days of receipt.
  2. To decide whether the member has the skill, expertise and experience to undertake the tasks required for that piece of work, and to return any instructions to the appropriate clerk that fall outside this requirement.
  3. To comply with the instructions:
    1. by the target date specified in the instructions,
    2. by key dates required by the court or tribunal,
    3. by any protocol,
    4. within an appropriate period of time taking account of the complexity of the issues, the amount of work to be undertaken, or any time scale agreed with the person instructing the member.
  4. To attend any hearing as directed.
  5. To notify the appropriate clerk if the member encounters any difficulty in attending a hearing at the specified date and time.
  6. To inform the appropriate clerk of the outcome of any hearing, where possible on the day of the hearing.
  7. To endorse in a legible manner on or with the instructions the outcome of any hearing and of any other work done by the member, and to prepare an attendance note for the client.
  8. If the member is unable to undertake or complete any work, to return instructions and case papers promptly to the appropriate clerk.
  9. To keep all instructions and case papers safely, to encrypt where necessary, to respect case confidentiality and to ensure that instructions and case papers are disposed of appropriately when work has been completed.
  10. To comply with the Code of Conduct of the Bar, the constitution of chambers, and protocols issued by the specialist bar associations.
  11. To respect the confidentiality of others within chambers and of chambers business.
  12. To comply with directions from the Head of Chambers, the member’s head of department, and in relation to administrative arrangements, the member’s clerk.
  13. To comply with statutory requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
  14. To report to the Head of Chambers any issues that may have a bearing on the professional reputation of the member or affect the standing of chambers.

The blogger is confident that he has only just scraped the surface with his serious list. ‘Inviting  judges for dinner’, ‘working throughout the night’, ‘cancelling the annual holiday’, ‘dealing with difficult opponents’ are some of the tasks that have not been included, but maybe should be there. Of what would your list comprise?

Public Access

Once, a fringe, micro-aspect of work at the Bar, is Public Access to become the way forward to see the Bar through the 21st century?

Readers of the blog will know my friend Matthew Shardlake. Matthew was a tolerably successful advocate, and  ‘well connected’  for his time. Is this why he is one of the rare survivors from the 16th century? He was, of course, the fictional barrister created by C J Sansom for his Shardlake series ‘Dissolution’, ‘Dark Fire’, ‘Sovereign’, ‘Revelation’ and ‘Heartstone’, published between 2003 and 2010. Sansom’s novels chart the fate of the Tudor barrister as he played out his part in the sensational reformative events of the time.

My interest in Matthew Shardlake is less for his historical role, but more for his current relevance. It seems, in the times of Henry V111, that barristers operated a very effective form of public access. Indeed the work of the ‘solicitor’ was confined to that of a clerk – preparing cases for the barrister who would advocate in court. The difference was that the barrister received his (for in the C16 barristers were male) instructions from the client, and the barrister advised the retention of a solicitor or clerk to obtain depositions and liaise with the court.

Perhaps a sign of hard times, with economic recession and job insecurity, members of the public are questioning the cost of solicitors’ services, and why they really need them. With ever increasing levels of literacy and huge assistance from the internet, many clients want to tackle the basic tasks themselves rather than pay for a solicitor’s silver-plated service. Some appear as litigants in person; but others are becoming ‘supported litigants’, who retain a barrister for the tasks of advising them and advocating in court.

The change comes at a clear cost to the legal profession. Many solicitors are feeling the rub – just as the Bar felt when solicitors sought and obtained higher rights of audience. Neither is the Bar immune to collateral stress from the fact that non-legal clients are preparing their own case.

Well managed, the advent of public access need not be hard for the Bar, and may be part of its salvation. For years, barristers have had to await a solicitor’s instruction, courting them and managing their preferences. But with direct public access, clients have the chance to check out a chosen barrister and instruct them directly. They receive early, cost-effective advice and keep control over the purse strings. The professional roles are reversed – now the chosen barrister nominates a solicitor to undertake only those tasks that are beyond the client.

So, we return, as inevitably we would, to the days of Matthew Shardlake. The court may not be the ‘Court of Common Pleas’ – now more probably a county or family court in the provinces – but the re-ascendance of the Bar is possible.

More and more clients are going to seek early and less-costly contact with the barrister of their choice. They will have read about them in the press, met them in their communities, checked out their profile on a dizzy dozen of web sites and want to hear how their case looks to the practitioner who is going to advocate it. Wise lay client – lucky Bar.

Having led the way in public access to the Bar by piloting for the Bar Council for England and Wales the first two schemes under ‘Bar Direct’ in 1999, the blogger has had a regular ongoing relationship with direct access.

Mediation Information and Assessment Meetings

Has the number of private law children or financial remedy court cases dropped over the last year?

On 6 April 2011 rules came into force requiring divorcing couples to attend an information meeting  about mediation and other alternatives to court action -before issuing financial remedy or private law children proceedings.

To what extent have they been successful in diverting family cases away from the courts? Well, the picture emerging appears unclear.

Resolution commissioned a survey, which found that:

  • Court staff have not regarded it as mandatory that a party issuing an application should show evidence of having attended a MIAM. Only 56% of respondents to the survey said that courts asked about this when they applied to issue. One snapshot showed that in the Principal Registry in London, only 20% of applications were accompanied by evidence of attendance at a MIAM.
  • Rule 3.2 states that judges “must consider, at every stage in proceedings, whether alternative dispute resolution is appropriate”. Yet 78% of respondents said that their local courts hadn’t asked about this.
  • 20%  of solicitors who responded had only referred 0-10 % of their clients to a MIAM, whilst 30%  said they had referred the majority of their clients (91-100%) to a MIAM.
  • 89% of respondents reported that 0- 10% of their clients had self-referred to a MIAM.
  • It appears that courts in different regions are interpreting the rules in different ways.

Respondents’ feelings about MIAMs were clearly mixed. Some reported a higher level of mediation as a result of increased awareness. Many made the point that mediator or collaborative lawyers spot the cases needing a judge and consider a MIAM to be a fruitless additional hurdle. Others spoke of concerns about the cost of  a MIAM.

The Ministry of Justice has seen an increase in MIAMs compared with assessment meetings. Judge’s statistics are being checked to see if there is a decrease in applications coming before courts, and at what stage they are being compromised. In the Principal Registry, a 6 per cent drop in private law cases has been reported since April 2011.

The blogger has found MIAMs to be really useful on two levels. In some cases they have resolved all or some of the issues without the need for a court decision. In others they have helped to ease the adversarial nature of subsequent proceedings (especially in children cases), and softened the parties’ expectations of the court process.

Within a decade, the culture of family litigation is likely to change. MIAMs are starting to play a part in this. In almost every case there is something that can be agreed, and reaching some consensus oils the wheels for more collaboration between warring parties.

With thanks to Manches LLP and The Times Online

Sir Paul’s Campaign

“Save marriage”, says Sir Paul Coleridge, “from the destructive scourge” of divorce and family breakdown.

Baroness Butler-Sloss, Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, Baroness Deech and Baroness Shackleton have joined him in his quest. Iain Duncan Smith also chips in from the government bench, that ‘more should be done’ to prevent family breakdown.

At a time of rising divorce statistics it is understandable that concern should be expressed in such a visible way. Yes, children are better off with two loving and committed parents rather than a broken home and the principal or sole care of just one. But how, if at all, will Sir Paul’s campaign change the picture?

As a society, should we be pressing married parents of children to stay together? Do we make getting divorced a more difficult task? Should we be advocating marriage as the cornerstone of family life? What do we say to the childless spouses who contemplate separation, or will they have separate rules?

More importantly, is it right that those with a loving, fulfilling and solid marriage should be setting the bar for those who have not been so blessed? Or does the argument revolve around the ‘personal discipline’ of laying in beds we ourselves have made?

The problem probably rests, not with a social culture, but the simple fact that often the natural instinct of many men and women is one of serial monogamy. It is said that this arises from genetics rather than culture: more the consequence of ‘being’ rather than the effect of ‘Facebook’.

As a ‘family lawyer’ I will not be joining  Sir Paul’s team. Whilst my professional experience brings me  into contact with spouses whose relationship has become dysfunctional, I frequently meet people who should never have married each other, or even anyone at all. Some spouses simply contaminate their relationships, and the presence of children cannot justify maintaining the union. On the other hand, second, or even subsequent marriages or unmarried relationships can be extraordinarily successful and productive, both for the spouses and their children.

For my part, I have less regard for the social philosopher – than for those who realistically address the frail human condition. To encourage pre-separation counselling is one thing, but to opine on the sanctity or priority of marriage is quite another. Some cultures have tried it, and they end up stoning their perpetrators.

Perhaps we should be taking the myth out of marriage. Rather than encouraging  ‘the wedding-dress romance’, we should counsel a realistic view of marriage from the start. Better to discourage than to espouse. Healthier to emphasise the discipline, restraint and sacrifice that marriage may require, than to emblazon it as ‘the Gold Standard’.

Now ‘not so anonymous provincial barrister’

You will recall that Lucy Reed, award winning writer of ‘Pink Tape: a blog for the family bar‘ sought Family Justice Narratives from those working in the field of family law. The contributions to the narrative are illuminating. Visit her blog to read more about them. Here is one contribution that you may recognise.

Narrative No 3:  Now ‘not so anonymous provincial barrister’

Tell us where you fit in (solicitor, barrister, social worker, guardian, judge, researcher, court staff, something else)

I’m a Barrister. It’s a job I have been doing now for over 30 years. I am in independent practice, but work with others in a busy set of provincial chambers.

Tell us about your typical week Tell us about where you’re at this week (bad week, good week, rewarding week, soul destroying *headdesk* kind of week?)

Like the ‘Anonymous Social Worker’, I too never have a typical week. A lot of my work is in family courts, undertaking cases involving children – public law disputes concerning care proceedings and private law conflicts about residence and contact – and of course money (called financial remedies).  Here, over 60% of my colleagues are women, many of whom are young. It is fun interfacing with bright, intelligent, innovative younger people. I cover two other specialist fields which have nothing to do with family law, so I do get a break from the emotional side of practice. As well as acting as advisor and advocate in cases, I also have a mediation practice. This is the most enjoyable part of my work. Mediation is quite transformational, turning bitter conflict into workable solutions.

Tell us about the highs and lows and the reasons you do the job

You have to be passionate to be a barrister. After all, the main part of the job is taking on issues (some of which are very challenging) and fighting the case for your client. The ‘highs’ come from the sense of a job well done, although being competitive, I have to admit that ‘winning’ gives me a particular buzz. Getting to the end of a case and hearing those immortal words from your client “You were wonderful” is the best reason for being a barrister. The lows arise when you have a particularly challenging client, opponent or judge. The client who thinks that they know best, or the opponent who will not work flexibly, are my two biggest bug-bears. Judges are quite another thing, but these days if they get awkward, I just tell them to behave, or appeal their decisions. The job of barrister does require a lot of work out of hours, and this can be a drain on personal energy. Fortunately, being older, I get fewer last minute instructions, and when I do, I generally know from experience how to handle things. Then, there is the paperwork…..don’t get me started on that!

 

Tell us about what works well in the system and tell us about what does not work at all

Some say that our system of law is the best that can be devised. I disagree. In the area of family law, I think that the adversarial approach is out of date, and should be scrapped. It used to work when judges just had to listen and decide on what they heard. These days, judges are more proactive and investigatory – and this sits badly with an adversarial approach by advocates. I would like to see this change in family proceedings. Judges who want to inquire…let them inquire. Where advocates are needed, let them assist with this process. Currently, we have an uncomfortable balance between the one and the other.

Tell us about how you see the family justice system and how you think others see you and the system you work in

Tell us about an important influence on your work

The family justice system pretends that it is ‘child focussed’ but I am not too sure that this is strictly true. Frequently the voice of the child, or children, is drowned out by the battle between parents – or parents and local authorities. It is rare to come across a case where relationships between the adult players are functional. I often feel that they get in the way of proper, child focussed solutions.  Rather radically, I question whether parents in care proceedings, or private law proceedings, really need ‘party status’? Generally, parents want to tell a judge how they feel and what they want. They do not really want to run cases. They are certainly not good at it. On the other hand, the job of case management cannot simply be handed over to local authorities.  Why not give that job of case management to a properly resourced Children’s Guardian? The parents could then say what they wanted as compellable witnesses, each proofed by the Guardian’s solicitor. It would mean lean time for lawyers, but would simplify and speed up what is currently a protracted and expensive process.

 

Tell us about how you combine your family with your work and how your experiences impact on your relationships and your parenting

Being a barrister requires discipline, and part of this is ‘knowing when to stop work’ – for the day, the week, or the season. I learned from a colleague’s experience. One weekend, as usual he was reading a brief when a little note appeared under his study door, “daddy, are you coming out to help celebrate my birthday?” When my son was young I always took two months off work in the summer so that I could enjoy summer holidays with the family. Yes, its two months without an income, but then you simply budget for this, if you have the right practice. Normally, I will avoid any mid-week commitments, as almost certainly, a late brief will come in on the night you have arranged to go out or entertain friends.

Tell us – would you choose this job in your next life? and will you be doing it in ten years time?

In ten years time I will be well past working age, but if I wasn’t I probably would still be working as a barrister. I much prefer the collaborative approach of problem solving, so would hope to develop my mediation practice. What about my next life? As a barrister?…most certainly not! I want to come back as a creative artist – art, music, dance: everything that is the opposite of what I do now.

And tell us your bright ideas for change and for dialogue

First, move family law from the adversarial process. Introduce more collaborative working practices. Use some of the money that is spent on ‘fighting cases’ to bring about change – in parenting practices, local authority resources, representation of children. Next, save the judges for the final stage of cases, where options are balanced and tested, and decisions need to be made. The ‘case managers’ need only go before a judge if they cannot agree what is needed. Most advocates (especially some of the younger ones) are very good case managers. Why should they, their clients and other professionals spend a morning, or worse – a whole day at court to deal with administrative decisions which they could fix by email or over the phone? Finally, keep politics out of family proceedings. Ken, I think you know what I mean….

Policing Britain

Photograph: Matt Cardy/Getty Images

In the mid 1970’s as part of the national Queen’s Police Gold Medal Essay competition, the blogger (then a youthful Metropolitan Police Officer) submitted a paper on Policing Reform.

The blogger’s  idea was to divide UK policing into three separate functions: the ‘Police Community Service’, the ‘Police Office’, and the ‘Police Agency’ – yes, very radical proposals at that time.

Clearly, the essay hit the establishment like a wet blamange…in fact less than that – it caused no reaction whatsoever, to be hidden away as a losing entry and certainly did not procure the writer a Gold Medal.

But today….hello, South Yorkshire Police? Did someone dig out the blogger’s essay and re-jig it for Chief Constable, David Crompton?

The purpose of my three-way division of policing was to address the problems arising from a single police pyramid – to which recruits arrived, in which they were required to cover disparate and sometimes incompatible functions, and from which (when skilled and experienced) they were to be removed into police administration on promotion.

My proposal envisaged separating functions and responsibilities. It was driven by pragmatic desire for both rationalisation and appropriate career development, rather than cost. Therein may be the distinction from the current South Yorkshire Police pilot.

All police officers would start their careers as Community Service Officers, performing a peace-keeping function in the community, interfacing with other public bodies, such as social services, community mental health, education, probation, housing and the charitable sector. They would be visible and have a limited, but useful range of powers. Their tasks would be much to do with community cohesion as with enforcement. The department would have its own career structure, with the aim of retaining skilled community officers within this special field through to retirement.

Parallel to, and fed from the Community Service Department, would be the Police Office. Officers in this department would have similar powers and functions to those of current police officers, with investigative and enforcement responsibilities, save that they would be relieved of many of the social tasks undertaken by the Community Service teams.

Finally, to be fed from and having responsibility for both the ‘Community Service’ teams and the ‘Police Office’ (with the added option of recruiting outsiders with appropriate skills) would be the ‘Police Agency’. It would have tactical command of both police and community operations and policy.

How has the blogger’s vision stood the test of time? I now see reactive policing, with officers in stab-proof vests, festooned with handcuffs, sprays, and para-military pockets stuffed with kit, arriving in police vehicles long after they are needed. Frequently, their communication skills with the public are lamentable. I see town centres, both during the day and at night, devoid of any element of social management. Reflecting current concerns with the nursing sector, I see a loss of care and empathy in policing. More worrying, I do not sense a proper interface between policing and other social players who have responsibility within the community.

The separation of functions between police officers and those with community responsibility could have a hugely ameliorative impact on this. The Community team would be attentive to social management and support, providing a visible and financially sustainable presence. Likewise, Police Officers, skilled in observation, investigation, detection and restraint techniques – with the risks, responsibilities and pay that go with them – would be released to do precisely that.

In addition to the social benefits, such measures would enhance the career opportunities for many who choose to work in this important public sector. Those who see their future working in the community could develop their skills and further their careers whilst staying there. Those officers who seek specialist policing skills and are prepared to take the responsibilities that come with them, could gravitate to the Police Office. And with a separate Police Agency, streamlined management and public accountability would be a real possibility, rather than, as currently, an uncomfortable compromise between operational independence and political control.

Whilst an advert may appear at the foot, this blog is neither monetarised, nor endorsing any product

Disclosing interests

Has the Bar fallen behind the rest of society in its duty of disclosure?

For a number of years, the blogger has been involved in pro bono work with a UK charity, interfacing with many public authorities in the north of England. Between them, and the the Bar there seems to be a wide void of practice. In the public/charity sector, key to each appointment, contract and case taken –  is the disclosure of potential conflict of interests.

In a recent trawl of lawyer’s biographies, it is hard to discern what special interests members of the Bar or solicitors may have.  Here, the blogger is clearly not referring to ‘horse riding’, ‘modelling’, ‘fishing’ or event ‘tango dancing’, but to those activities or involvements that could give rise to – or might be perceived to result in a conflict of interest.

From the sample of biographies, it appears that we are good at promulgating our experience, skill sets and capacities; but reluctant to divulge any personal issues, links and in particular, financial interests. No, the Bar Standards Board has not requested publication of such ‘sensitive’ information, but perhaps we are simply ignoring a rising  moral duty to disclose.

How frequently has a barrister accepted instructions in a case that touches on a belief, prejudice, strongly held opinion or personal experience? In such cases, what if anything, has been shared with the professional or lay client? Are we right to separate ‘personal disclosure’ from possible professional conflict?

So often, when asked about personal feelings in taking on a case, I have rejoined “It is the exercise of a professional duty, not the indulgence of a personal belief”? And yet, at the root of all professional activity, we cannot and simply do not escape from our feelings and prejudices.

For most of my professional career, I have felt that this issue is not of importance, compared with the barrister’s duty to fight fearlessly for the client’s cause. The blogger senses that this is changing…the climate concerning the practice of disclosure has changed and continues to change. With the advent of internet searching is it not right that clients should track not just our passions, but also our prejudices?

Divorce Arbitration

Financial remedy mediators have been concerned that there would be some cases for which complete agreement might prove elusive – whether a small sticking-point, or a fundamental difference on a particular point.

It’s right to say that facilitation (or mediation) has a very high success rate. But those who are experienced in this field  felt that getting parties close to agreement, or even at the point where agreement was never going to happen, and then returning clients to the court process, was not a good idea.

This is where divorce arbitration comes in.

It was originally conceived as a ‘back-stop’ – to be suggested should facilitation not have succeeded in providing a full settlement. The offer of a private arbitration would create the opportunity for the parties to seek a binding outcome, enforced by the courts on the basis that both parties had agreed to it; and the resulting award would be sealed by a court unless there was a good reason not to do so.

This month sees the first forty family arbitrators, trained by the brand new Institute of Family Arbitrators, a group formed to deal with financial arrangements following separation. One of the forty, Marilyn Stowe, senior partner at Stowe Family Law, suggests that the arbitration process will be attractive to two groups of people – those involved in big-money cases, clients who don’t want to wait for the court process; and those who want a specific arbitrator to decide the case or a specific point.

The blogger senses that family dispute arbitration will be taken up by a wider client base. It is an attractive option, not just those with considerable wealth or specific needs – but the ordinary couple who have tried for a mediated settlement and would welcome a final solution should they not agree.

Perhaps Jane Croft’s article yesterday in the Financial Times misses an important point. Arbitration is not simply for the super-rich. After all, they can afford to fight their cases out behind closed doors, before a High Court Judge, with Queen’s Counsel representing them. No, the arrival of private arbitration in the field of financial remedy proceedings is for all – a simple, low-stress, economic alternative to the court battle.

Walk the tight rope

Standards at the Bar have fallen  for several reasons including,

“larger chambers and greater mobility between chambers as they compete for shrinking quantity of work from solicitors. This means that collegiate peer pressure to maintain ethics for the benefit of the group or chambers was weakened. The days of feeling free to share an ethical burden with the head of chambers and take advice are gone. Heads of Chambers are more like marketing tools these days. As a result, ethics has diminished as a subject or focus of legal practice. It’s been pushed out by structural changes“.  LuminiferousEther

‘LuminiferousEther’ was responding to the Guardian Law tweet that alerted ‘we internet fishers’ to the comments from UCL Professor Richard Moorhead about ethics and lawyers. Professor Moorhead contends that some lawyers walk “a dangerous and sometimes untenable path because commercially and culturally they were disposed to defend the client to the death.” He goes on to suggest that “the culture of clientelism needs a long hard look”.

Law director Sylvie Delacroix supports Richard Moorhead: “the gap between personal morality and professional ethics has grown wide in recent years. And as we have seen, conforming to professional standards isn’t always enough”.

Fascinatingly for the blogger, Silvie Delacroix suggests that an answer to the ethical issue facing lawyers would be to “promote space for discussion”. We should respond more like doctors, sharing ethical issues; and we should prioritise the teaching of ethics as part of lawyer training. Perhaps this landscape of thinking goes some way to justify the barrister’s blog – open to all, wide ranging, inclusive discussion; rather than secretive ‘commenteering’ by professionals behind closed doors.

As a profession, are we in danger of prioritising ‘outcome focus’ rather than ‘doing what is right’? The adversarial process certainly drives ‘outcomes’ rather than ‘fairness’. What part of our duty involves ‘fairness’?

In the ‘Fair Minded and Informed Observer‘ we considered the burgeoning pressure on the legal profession to identify and promote fairness.  And in ‘The Price is Right‘ the blogger refers to the prospect of third party investment in litigation, and the recent development of chambers wholly owned by a holding company. When lawyers are owned by hedge funds – what then about professional ethics?

With thanks to Alex Aldridge

Jury disservice

Photo courtesy of http://www.dailymail.co.uk

A post describing what happens if you dodge jury service without a good excuse

“The sentence of the court is 56 days imprisonment of which you will serve up to half”.

What have March, Malta lies, deception and Sciatica got in common? The answer lies in a robbery trial last month at Preston Crown Court.

At the outset, the trial judge H H Judge Baker, took pains to check whether any proposed juror would face difficulties if they were sworn in to deal with a four week robbery trial. The case concerned raids by accused Raymond Mallen on security vehicles carrying cash. This was a big trial, with huge implications for the defendant, witnesses and society.

On the Monday of the fourth week, just as the summing up was about to start, jurer Janet Chapman did not turn in, instead sending a message “Hello, this is Janet Chapman Juror Number ***. I won’t be attending court for a period of up to two weeks. I have got to return to the doctors next Tuesday. I have got sciatica. Thank you. Bye”.

But rather than being bed-ridden, she is on a plane to Malta with her partner Raymond Pritchard. The £699  trip was planned three months earlier in January, although according to Mr Pritchard, had been concealed as a secret until the night before.

In sentencing, the Recorder of Preston, H H Judge Anthony Russell QC said “Jury service is one of the most important public duties that a citizen of this country can be called upon to perform. It is inconvenient, but an essential part of our democratic system. It is essential that the duty of jury service is taken seriously by those called upon to perform it, and that it is performed diligently and responsibility”.

Mallen the robber was convicted by the remains of the jury and got 12 years imprisonment.  The rest of the robbery gang got 80 years in total. Janet Chapman the juror is serving her 28 days. Mr Pritchard, the disbelieved schemer, is “choking back his tears at his semi-detached property on the outskirts of Blackpool”. Perhaps he is lucky not to have joined them for ‘seeking to pervert the course of justice’?

The case highlights issues of social responsibility. There was a time when the question of jury service for those eligible, would have gone unquestioned. Janet Chapman reflects contemporary thinking that social responsibility is a question of personal choice. At a time when ‘some’ are carrying a high level of responsibility for ‘others’, isn’t it refreshing that Judge Anthony Russell should give a wake up call to those who feel that they can shirk their share of duty?

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“Seen but now heard”

A post about Gillian Irving QC’s talk concerning children giving evidence in family proceedings

How could anyone make Re W (Children) 2010 UKSC 12 and the 2011 ‘Guidelines in relation to children giving evidence in family proceedings‘ -interesting?

Well, tonight in Middlesbrough in her fascinating lecture opening the Dere Street Barristers Lecture Season, Gillian Irving QC did exactly that.

For decades we have shied away from the prospect of children being called to give evidence in family proceedings. We have fallen behind the criminal bar, where wigs have been removed and video examination skills have been honed. Gillian’s presentation updated the approach of family courts, from LM (A Child, by her Guardian) v Medway Council & RM & YM (2007) EWCA Civ 9, through to RE X (a child) (2011) EWHC 3401.

The topic raised by Gillian Irving raises a number of controversial questions.

First, the real effect on the child of giving evidence in family proceedings. This appears to be a significantly under-researched issue. Where courts are under  a duty to balance justice, fairness and the protection of child witnesses, it would seem that this particular topic should be properly evaluated. The blogger is not aware of more than anecdotal evidence on the question, answers to which are clearly required. Can any readers point to recent research where the issue has been considered?

The second is the role of the ‘intermediary’, and the ‘communication specialist’. The blogger has some experience of these roles in the disability setting, where especially the ‘profoundly deaf’ will be afforded special assistance and access to the court process through communication specialists and relay interpreters. The use of intermediaries and communication specialists in family cases may open trapdoors to whirlpools.

Finally and critically, paragraph 21 of the Guidelines appears to shift some of the burden of ‘fairness’ from the court – to the advocates: “All advocates have a responsibility to manage the questioning of a child witness fairly”. Whilst this will be the guiding principle for most family law advocates, inevitably there will be conflicts of duty to advance the client’s case at some risk to a child witness. How is this duty to be balanced professionally by counsel, and how will the duty be interpreted by the court? Is this not another example of the inherent conflict in dealing with sensitive family issues within an essentially adversarial system of law? Perhaps this should be added to the catalogue of reasons that call into question our current approach to family conflicts?

Family Justice Narratives

A guest post from Lucy Reed, the nation’s top legal blogger

The blogger thanks Lucy Reed of ‘Pink Tape: a blog for the family Bar‘ for agreeing to post her fascinating idea for Family Justice Narratives here.

To reply, follow the link to Lucy’s blog, or email Lucy at  familoo@pinktape.co.uk.

Family Justice Narratives   –   Lucy Reed

I like the sound of my own keyboard, but recently I invited you all to share your perspective on things, to tell a story other than mine (original post here). And quite a few of you replied saying you’d like to take part. So here is how I’d like to do this. I’ve drawn up a list of questions – not to constrain but to guide. I’m hoping they will form a loose sort of structure and that participants will answer those where they think they can say something interesting, ignoring those that don’t grab them or which aren’t relevant to them. You don’t need to take them in order.

The questions:

  • Tell us where you fit in (solicitor, barrister, social worker, guardian, judge, researcher, court staff, something else)
  • Tell us about your typical week
  • Tell us about where you’re at this week (bad week, good week, rewarding week, soul destroying *headdesk* kind of week?)
  • Tell us about the highs and lows and the reasons you do the job
  • Tell us about what works well in the system and tell us about what does not work at all
  • Tell us about how you see the family justice system and how you think others see you and the system you work in
  • Tell us about an important influence on your work
  • Tell us about how you combine your family with your work and how your experiences impact on your relationships and your parenting
  • Tell us – would you choose this job in your next life? and will you be doing it in ten years time?
  • And tell us your bright ideas for change and for dialogue.

The rules:

  • Anonymous is ok.
  • Don’t give details of the contents of documents or of what has been said in court in individual cases, don’t breach client confidentiality (remembering that you can be in breach if your client can identify their anonymous self).
  • Don’t be abusive or defamatory.
  • Expect others to disagree with your views – check back for comments and engage with them.

This is a project which is intended to inform and to provoke constructive and respectful if robust debate. I am not inviting parents to contribute for reasons which I’ve already set out in the original post, but which are probably worth repeating here. In a nutshell two main reasons: 1 Publication of information about individual cases is prohibited. 2 There is already a wealth of information concerning parental experiences of the justice system out there, I’m trying to address the imbalance in the publicly available information about the family justice system so that voices from a range of different perspectives can make themselves heard.

Submissions can be sent to familoo@pinktape.co.uk. I will publish them under a #narratives tag.

Lucy

Fake barrister

A post about a bogus barrister in the news

Today’s Guardian reminds us to watch our wigs and get our submissions right.

Photograph: Ben Birchall/PA

Mrs Justice Laura Cox, sitting at Bristol Crown Court has sentenced David Evans to 18 months imprisonment for impersonating a barrister. Here was a man with a “grandiose sense of self-importance” who posed as a barrister to represent a friend.

David Evans chatted in the advocates’ dressing room and even got into the cells to visit his “client”, cannabis farmer Terry Moss.

H H Judge Stephen Wildblood, presiding in the confiscation hearing noticed that Evans wore a solicitor’s gown and a barrister’s wig.  To compound his mistake, his legal submissions were “hopelessly wrong”. When the judge questioned Evans about his legal qualifications, he admitted he had none.

Mrs Justice Laura Cox told Evans, “the planning of this enterprise was entirely yours, it was your decision to style yourself as a senior advocate. You are a complex and clearly intelligent man … you have a grandiose sense of self-importance.”

Evans told the court he was a “senior advocate” at a London law firm. H H Judge Stephen Wildblood, became suspicious, and noted, ”although there may be circumstances in which a solicitor may wear a wig, it struck me immediately as strange. I was surprised to see the confusion of court attire.”

Evans was arrested and charged with “carrying out reserved legal activities when not entitled to” and “wilfully pretending to be a person with the right of audience”. He had denied both charges, yet a Bristol jury took 30 minutes to convict.

The blogger wonders how Evans would have fared against the Quality Assurance Scheme for advocates? Perhaps level 2?

Mediation Bill – Ireland

Image by Stephen Twist

A post about the Irish Mediation Bill

Did you know that on 1 March 2012 the Irish Department of Justice published its draft general scheme for a Mediation Bill?

Under the Bill, mediation would be facilitated and encouraged in civil, commercial and family disputes – replacing litigation wherever appropriate. Yes, the Law Reform Commission’s recommendations in their ‘Report on Alternative Dispute Resolution – Mediation and Conciliation‘ have been taken and acted upon.

The draft Bill proposes:

  • A new statutory duty on solicitors and barristers to inform their clients about mediation as an alternative means of resolving disputes before issuing a claim – and to certify that they have done so;
  • Confidentiality of all communications between parties in the course of mediation;
  • Empowering the parties to engage in mediation and deciding their mediated outcomes – but providing for binding agreements unless specified otherwise;
  • Giving the courts statutory powers to ‘invite’ parties to consider mediation, enabling adjournments for this purpose, and power to award costs to those unreasonably refusing to engage;
  • Placing  an obligation on mediators to inform the parties of their qualifications/training, and to report back to the court on outcomes.

The Minister is to forward the draft Bill to the Joint Oireachtas Committee for Justice, Defence and Equality prior to publication. The Committee has until 1 June 2012 to report back to the Minister.

(With thanks to Jarleth Heneghan & Cassandra Byrne).

China – new legislation on police detention

A post examining dissension in undemocratic jurisdictions
With thanks to the Guardian 8 March 2012
Photograph: David Gray/Reuters
Earlier this month, China unveiled legislation allowing police to hold those suspected of ‘state crimes’ at unknown and unnamed locations, but after much controversy, has removed a secrecy clause permitting police to hold some suspects for up to six months without informing their families.

State security crimes include subversion and other vaguely-worded charges often used against dissidents.

Having spent 11 months of the last five years in Buenos Aires I became familiar with the stories of ‘los desaparecidos’ of Argentina – up to 30,000 dissidents that in the late 1970’s were spirited away at nightfall, some to be dropped from aircraft into the Atlantic, many never to be seen again. Now, each Thursday, the female relatives and supporters of the disappeared silently circle Plaza de Mayo (between  the Presidential Palace Casa Rosada and the Parliament Congreso) – in memory and in protest.

With the amendment of the Chinese legislation, legalised disappearances may be avoided in  China, but the overall import of the new procedure is far from clear.

When Pu Zhiqiang, a Beijing lawyer who has taken on sensitive cases such as those involving dissidents, spoke out about the issue of enforcement of the legislation, police attended his offices to prevent him making further comment.

How many lawyers working as we do in democratically accountable systems take for granted some aspects of  important protection offered by our laws against state control? Are we  conditioned in a moderate climate to perceive the excesses of unaccountable detention as a distant and unlikely threat? Now within our global environment, it is not even more important that we are prominent and heard on these issues? Perhaps that is one of the essential justifications for an independent Bar; something worth fighting for.

Paper-free Revisited

A post describing my ‘paper-free’ experience in Family Care Proceedings

Since writing my post on ‘Paper Free Practice‘, for the first time in Care Proceedings, I have been to court without the case papers. Yes, I remembered my flask, but there was not a file to be seen.

At this stage of the proceedings (Interim Care Order) there were only eleven critical documents, all of which were all safely stored and available on my Samsung Galaxy Tablet which nestled in my inside jacket pocket. The documents comprised a mixture of Word, PDF and picture files, received by email attachment and which I had read on screen the night before.

I have to admit that I rather envied the sensible IPad owners who, with that clever little IAnnotate App are able to highlight text and book-mark pages. Whilst the rest  turn pages, the Ipaders simply flick between documents with the dab of a fingerprint.

I found the Galaxy tab near perfect for the job. With RepliGo Reader 3.2 the IAnnote features for PDF’s are available for Androids. Click on this link to watch the video demonstration, although I suspect you will not need the ‘night mode’ unless you find yourself listed N/B 1400 hrs before the Northallerton FPC.

The search facility is of considerable use, allowing you to find the precise point without trailing visually through page after page. Also important is the facility to click to the list of your annotations. From there you have simple and fast access to the individual entries you have made. The digital signature operation is also of great use and will allow you to sign documents under the EU Electronic Signatures Directive and section 7 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000.

If you are contemplating the digital age with relish, my advice would be simply to go for broke and get an IPad 3 with 4G. This way you will have access to everything you want, when you need it. For example, the other day my opponent – a London silk – was able to access each statute and statutory instrument as it was named, although I am not too sure how comfortable he was with the Magistrates’ Courts (Hearsay in Civil Proceedings) Rules 1999!

To undertake, or simply to agree?

A post about Practice Direction 33A and its implications for enforcement of orders

Family practitioners take note- Stephen Alderson has delivered another very sensible letter concerning orders in family cases. Knowing you, as only the DS Blogger does, many will simply have clicked on his message and told yourselves that you will read it later. And who can blame you. You are too busy with important matters.

In the spirit of attending to your needs, saving you time, and making things simple, the blogger will tell you what you need to know.

First, Philip Waller, senior DJ at the Family Division Principal Registry has been chatting with his fellow DJ’s around the block. They (including Stephen Alderson) are really concerned about PD 33A. It is to do with ‘undertakings’, and the attachment of a ‘disobedience’ warning.

Now that we barristers have the job of drawing up the orders, we need to get them right. In summary, whenever you thought about including the word ‘undertaking’ in your order, forget it unless you want the offender locked up or flailed. Instead, try the word ‘agreement’ or ‘agree’. It is perfect in a recital,  and carries with it the clear intention of the parties. This way, the judge does not have to threaten imprisonment  for any transgressor. They are happy; and you have shown yourself to be an intelligent drafts-person. DJ Stephen Alderson warns “be prepared to answer the question as to why you need a penal notice”.

Interestingly, the point goes a step further than first appears. Is this another example of the ‘modification’ of family proceedings, away from ‘the order of the court’ to ‘the agreement of the parties’? The blogger thinks it is, and applauds the move. Before too long, court orders will comprise a recital of agreements rather than a record of findings and requirements.

Perhaps another reason to get a mediation qualification?

Judged by Judges

A post examinining the Quality Assurance Scheme for advocates: merits and pitfalls

Calling all criminal practitioners. What say you to the Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates? Are you ready to be judged on your next trip to Teesside Combined Court Centre? Is it likely that you will make the grade? Have you boned yourself up on the 161 criteria?

For those who are not yet familiar with the QASA, it seems that we are to be graded by the Judges. Next time you make that ‘marginal’ submission on your client’s instructions, watch out for the Judge’s pen. If it is yellow, you are a beginner and your very career hangs in the balance. If it is cerise and you are desperate for silk, all may ride on your draw of Judge. Let us hope it is not the one you upset last week, or you will have to forget the whole thing and ask your clerk for a couple of briefs in the magistrates court instead.

Appendix 1: (just beyond page 41 of the Great Little Guide to QASA  produced to make the scheme transparent and simple), sets out the ‘statement of standards’. Then scroll down to Appendix 2 to see how the Judge’s will decide your fate. But if you are truly ambitious, make sure you read (and learn) all two hundred pages. You know what they say about exams – it is all decided by the way in which you answer the questions.

The blogger tends towards Lord Justice Moses‘ approach to the topic. There does seem to be something uncomfortable about standing up to the judge who may forever damage your prospects at the Bar. C143 – “press your client to plead guilty”  looks like a recipe for disaster, as does B132 – “when tears appear, throw your hand in”. Beginners should watch A29 – meaning “do what I want you to do” and B91 – “be nice to witnesses”. B121 means “stop pressing just before the witness confesses” but B140 is the killer – “do as the judge pleases, and don’t upset him/her”.

The future of criminal advocacy is to be in good hands. It is now no longer the jury that you will have to please, but the judge.

 

The modern tradition: a new concept of history

A post requested of several readers, revised and re-posted from the former Dere Street Barristers Blog.

 Photo by www.oldukphotos.com

 In 1385 by Royal Ordinance, York acquired its very first legal counsel, the ‘Recorder of York’ – a gentleman “with knowledge of the law and of good reputation”.

In the intervening 627 years this fact has been obscured by the passage of time and memory.

In 2012, York gained its first national grouping of barristers-at-law, with over 100 resident gentlemen and ladies with knowledge and practice of the law.

What better reason than to start a new tradition:

the ‘ Barristers’ Annual Procession’.

About the Idea

Inspired by C J Sansom’s Sovereign, recalling King Henry V111’s 1541 progress from London to York, the Barristers’ Annual Procession is proposed as a secular celebratory event to mark the important and cherished relationship between the City, the Bar and the Judiciary of York.

On a selected Saturday morning annually, robed barristers, lead possibly by the York Waits, would conduct an annual procession from Toft Green (formerly Kings Toft) and Bar Lane to Micklegate Bar, to ascend the city walls. Travelling west, they descend at Skeldergate, crossing Terry Avenue (reminding us of our late colleague Robert Terry) on Bishopsgate Bridge, turning north into Tower Street to cross over to the Eye of York.

On the steps of the Crown Court would be the current incumbent of the Ordinance – the Recorder of York, flanked by the Sheriff of York, Under Sheriff and Chief Constable of North Yorkshire Police. The senior barrister present would present their respects to the Recorder of York together with a white rose, marking the preservation and protection of the rule of law for York for the coming year.

Following the ceremony, the Recorder, Sheriff, Under Sheriff & Chief Constable would be invited as guests to luncheon at the Merchant Adventurers Hall, Fossgate.

Members of the Bar should see this idea as an opportunity to build and maintain professional relationships – with the city, with each other, and with personal guests.

Guests for the luncheon could include chosen solicitors, spouses or partners, seated by ‘Inns of Court tradition’, in messes of four.

Whilst the luncheon would be a private affair, the procession and ceremony at the Eye of York should be a very public event. Local press and outside broadcasting would be invited to capture the occasion, and the City of York Council encouraged to publicise it as a York annual event in their calendar. Departure from Toft Green may be collaborative with York Brewery, marking the importance of the merchants of York to the historic peace-keeping role.

Such an event would afford members of the bar an opportunity to show thanks to their solicitors for their support over the previous year, and to maintain both civic and social bonds that are so essential for the future of the Bar.

Parents in Care Proceedings: Parties or witnesses?

Photo by Gerard Van der Leun

“The worst aspect of care proceedings arises not from the unfair intervention of local authorities, but the unrealistic expectations of parents”.

How controversial is that?  As barristers we spend a significant proportion of our professional lives exposing, or modifying local authorities’ incursions into the family lives of our clients, and sometimes with great success. The blogger recalls intervening in a recent case where the trial judge considered that both the local authority and the Children’s Guardian had got it very wrong, and ordered the return of the children to mother within hours of the judgment.

But quite often there is a fundamental issue with regard to parents’ care, or at least a real cause for concern that needs to be addressed. In such cases is the current adversarial process the best way of addressing it?

The Human Rights Act capture of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights arrived some time after the then Mr Justice Judge said that ‘the difference between public bodies and individuals is that individuals are permitted to do anything not prescribed by law, whilst public bodies may only act as the law permits’. Both tell the same story – that individual rights and freedoms come first in a democratic system of law making.

Where then the question of party status for parents in public law children cases?

The ‘paramountcy principle’ which drives the Children Act 1989 arose as we know from a long history of trial and error in relation to child care and protection. Yes, we have moved some way from the  corrupt Tudor Court of Wards, where Wardship was determined according to the value of the ward’s estate. The blogger recalls his long weekend in Windsor with the then Mrs Justice Butler-Sloss and the then Mistress of Girton College, Mary Warnock whilst some of the structure of the Act was considered. Putting the child first was its aim, but did the Act really accomplish this?

In the perennial tension of competing rights and duties, the voice of parents was retained as a constitutional and jurisprudential ‘must’. But is it essential to keep it in the form of party status?

It has recently been suggested that the controlling management of children’s cases by local authorities should be counter-balanced by an increased management role for the Children’s Guardian.

Imagine a case where, with early, properly resourced intervention, a Guardian working with the Children’s solicitor takes an overall management role in relation to care proceedings. Rather than the long line of different judges (or magistrates), it is the Guardian’s lawyer who ‘case manages’ the proceedings, convening advocates meetings, suggesting a proper approach to the instruction of experts where the parties agree, ensuring that the statements prepared and filed do not replicate each other, where positions are clarified and recorded at the earliest stage; and where recourse to a judge occurs only where the parties dissent from the Guardian’s steer?

With this alone, the five lever arch files could be reduced to two (0r better a small e-file), the number of time consuming and resource expending hearings could be contained to a minimum, and perhaps a less adversarial approach to care proceedings would be possible.

The next question would simply be “why not release the parents from the case management role as parties, and give them automatic (and compellable) witness status”?

In a child-centred system of care proceedings where the children are represented by a Guardian Case Presenter, the party roles could be almost invisible. Witness statements from the parents could be taken by the Guardian’s lawyer and these would become their pleadings in the case. Party status of the local authority could be modified, so that ultimate control was wrested away to provide the necessary balance of rights and obligations.

Clearly, there will always be a need for ‘party status’ for some parents – where serious allegations are to be adjudicated, or where significant harm as defined on Form Ex506 would justify an enhancement, but in so many cases parents would simply be relieved of an unmanageable burden contained in an adversarial process.

Over the next decade or so, will we see an end to the adversarial approach to family law? The signs are already there in private law cases, and the cost/time/stress reasons are becoming more prominent. Is this the last era of the lawyer-led family law dispute? Now, you must have your own thoughts about this? Why not reflect them here on the blog?


Problem solving: family reporting, mediation and the courts

A post to examine the future of mediation in the court setting

A number of family law practitioners have been asking me about the future of mediation, in particular, family mediation. If you are contemplating undertaking training, it is an important question, and worthy of a measured answer.

I came to family mediation by an unconvential route. Eleven years ago, training as a commercial mediator, I had little expectation then that family law would reveal such fertile acres for the family facilitator – it was inconceivable that mediation would be more than a sticking plaster for fractured families. Part III of the Family Law Act 1996 was still-born and quickly to be buried three years later. But Woolf’s Civil Procedure Rules in 1999 and later the current Family Procedure Rules were to change all that.

I envisage that within the next few years there will be a massive revolution in the way in which private law family disputes are managed.

Most district judges (rightly or not) no longer support the traditional ‘adversarial approach’ to resolving residence, contact and specific issue matters. Advocates schooled in examination, cross examination and re examination are dinosaurs in the district judge’s lounge. Less time is spent looking at what is ‘wrong’ and more time examining the ways to fix it.

Private family law is all to do with ‘problem solving’. Rather than seeing themselves simply as ‘reporters’, CAFCASS are placing considerable focus on both facilitation meetings (where the CAFCASS officer mediates the dispute) and family group conferencing (where the parties themselves forge an outcome).

The way forward will probably be a hybrid of both approaches. Many cases of family conflict do not lend themselves to round table discussions, and where there has been a history of domestic conflict or violence, family meetings are fraught with danger. But I come across few private law family cases where some element of facilitation would not have improved family functioning; and I encounter a surprising volume of instances where it can actually problem solve the main issues.

So, the courts want to know less about what is wrong – or indeed how to fix it; but expect the family court support practitioners to do the fixing. No, we do not need psychological profiling of parents – we need the application of simple remedial skills of the mediator to bring about changes in family functioning.

Where does that leave us as a profession? Well, certainly not litigating conflict in private law family disputes. First, the judge’s don’t want it; second, the government won’t pay for it; and third, the changes in expectation of both process and professional intervention will not support it. Yes, we are to be mediators, whether we like it or not. I for one, like it and see it as a treasured skill leading to a rich seam of professional satisfaction.

 

Stephen Twist 2012 : the blog.


Photo courtesy of the Guardian

Welcome to Stephen Twist’s Barrister blog. This is where both you and I may say the things we always wanted to say, but never found the time to express.

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